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Implementing price cops in telecommunications

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  • John E. Kwoka

Abstract

Over the past few years, price caps have replaced rate-of-return regulation in many sectors of telecommunications. This article focuses on the key implementation issues raised in the Federal Communications Commission's formulation of price cap plans for AT&T and the local telephone exchange carriers. Specifically, it discusses company cost changes over time and the formulas employed to track costs; the multiplicity of prices and the structure of regulations designed to cap them; and the inevitability of errors in the long run and the disincentives likely to result from efforts to correct such errors. It concludes with an evaluation of the performance of these price cap plans, noting how the resolution of these various issues has affected plan success.

Suggested Citation

  • John E. Kwoka, 1993. "Implementing price cops in telecommunications," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(4), pages 726-752.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:12:y:1993:i:4:p:726-752
    DOI: 10.2307/3325348
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Bernstein, Jeffrey I & Sappington, David E M, 1999. "Setting the X Factor in Price-Cap Regulation Plans," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 5-25, July.
    4. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.

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