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The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors

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Author Info
Coase, R H

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Abstract

It is commonly said that in 1926 General Motors was led to acquire its supplier of automobile bodies, Fisher Body, because Fisher Body held up General Motors. It is claimed that Fisher Body did this by locating its body plants far away from the General Motors assembly plants and by adapting inefficient methods of production, thus increasing both the cost of producing bodies and the profits of Fisher Body under its cost-plus contract. This tale is factually incorrect. What General Motors acquired in 1926 was the 40 percent of the shares of Fisher Body that it did not already own. Furthermore, Fisher Body did not locate its plants far away from the General Motors assembly plants. It is also most implausible, for many reasons, that the Fisher brothers would have used inefficient methods of production. There is no evidence that a holdup occurred. Copyright 2000 by the University of Chicago.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 43 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 15-31
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:43:y:2000:i:1:p:15-31

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  1. Elodie Bertrand & Christophe Destais, 2002. "Le « théorème de Coase », une réflexion sur les fondements microéconomiques de l'intervention publique," Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 111-124. [Downloadable!]
  2. David de Meza & Marianno Selvaggi, 2003. "Please Hold me Up: Why Firms Grant Exclusive Dealing Contracts," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/066, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  3. Paul H. Jensen & Robin E. Stonecash, 2004. "The Efficiency of Public Sector Outsourcing Contracts: A Literature Review," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2004n29, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  4. Sergei Guriev & Dmitriy Kvasov, 2005. "Contracting on Time," Working Papers w0059, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
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  5. Olivier Sautel & Cécile Cézanne-Sintès, 2007. "Firme intensive en capital humain et coordination : vers une redéfinition du rapport entre intégration et dé-intégration," Post-Print hal-00331454_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  6. Adrian Bridge & Clem Tisdell, 2006. "The determinants of the vertical boundaries of the construction firm: response," Construction Management & Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 24(3), pages 233-236, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Makoto Hanazono, 2004. "Holdup with Subsidized Investment," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 640, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  8. Seth Norton, 2004. "Information processing in the theory of the firm: the rise of General Motors," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 123-140, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Andreas Roider, 2006. "Fisher Body revisited: Supply contracts and vertical integration," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 181-196, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. C. Manuel Willington, 2004. "Hold-Up under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 231, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Frank Mathewson & Ignatius J. Horstmann, 2004. "Coordination, Specialization and Incentives: An Equilibrium Model of Firm Boundaries," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 266, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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