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The Fable of Fisher Body

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Author Info
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon
Spulber, Daniel F

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Abstract

General Motors's (GM's) acquisition of Fisher Body is the classic example of market failure in the literature on contracts and the theory of the firm. According to the standard account, in 1926 GM merged vertically with Fisher Body, a maker of auto bodies, because of concerns over transaction-specific investment and contractual holdup. That account exhibits errors of historical fact and interpretation. General Motors acquired a 60 percent interest in Fisher Body in 1919. Moreover, the contractual arrangements and working relationship prior to the 1926 merger exhibited trust rather than opportunism. Fisher Body's production technology did not exhibit asset specificity. The merger reflected economic considerations specific to that time, not some immutable market failure. We demonstrate that vertical integration was directed at improving coordination of production and inventories, assuring GM of adequate supplies of auto bodies, and providing GM with access to the executive talents of the Fisher brothers. Copyright 2000 by the University of Chicago.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 43 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 67-104
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:43:y:2000:i:1:p:67-104

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  2. Keith Head & John Ries & Barbara J. Spencer, 2002. "Vertical Networks and US Auto Parts Exports: Is Japan Different?," NBER Working Papers 9162, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. David de Meza & Marianno Selvaggi, 2003. "Please Hold me Up: Why Firms Grant Exclusive Dealing Contracts," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/066, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  4. Sharon Novak & Scott Stern, 2007. "Complementarity Among Vertical Integration Decisions: Evidence from Automobile Product Development," NBER Working Papers 13232, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Olivier Sautel & Cécile Cézanne-Sintès, 2007. "Firme intensive en capital humain et coordination : vers une redéfinition du rapport entre intégration et dé-intégration," Post-Print hal-00331454_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  6. Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft, 2008. "A la recherche d'une théorie de la firme pertinente historiquement - Retour sur le cas d'intégration verticale General Motors - Fisher Body (1926)," Post-Print hal-00203553_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  7. Seth Norton, 2004. "Information processing in the theory of the firm: the rise of General Motors," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 123-140, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, 2001. "Apparel Distribution:@Inter-firm Contracting and Intra-firm Organization," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-103, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  9. Andreas Roider, 2006. "Fisher Body revisited: Supply contracts and vertical integration," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 181-196, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Frank Mathewson & Ignatius J. Horstmann, 2004. "Coordination, Specialization and Incentives: An Equilibrium Model of Firm Boundaries," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 266, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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