Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Timing "Disturbances" in Labor Market Contracting: Roth's Findings and the Effects of Labor Market Monopsony

Contents:

Author Info

  • George L. Priest
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper addresses Alvin Roth's findings of market contracting at times earlier than optimal for market participants, which Roth describes as market "unraveling," a market failure he proposes to solve by designing centralized buyer-seller matching programs. This paper shows that, while Roth's engineering solutions are ingenious, the early contracting phenomena derive from labor market monopsony. Under monopsony, price is unavailable to clear the market; time of contract becomes the currency for working out market forces. Roth's matching serves to shore up the monopsony and would be unnecessary if the monopsony were removed; a superior solution is to end the monopsony. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/650761
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.

    Volume (Year): 28 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 2 (04)
    Pages: 447-472

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:28:y:2010:i:2:p:447-472

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Alan Manning, 2010. "Imperfect competition in the labour market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 28729, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:28:y:2010:i:2:p:447-472. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.