Discretion and Incentives in Organizations
AbstractWe analyze the link between workers' discretion and incentives in an organisation that lasts for several periods. In a long-lasting affiliation, it is possible for the principal to learn and update her beliefs about essential characteristics associated with either the job or the agent. This learning possibility has an important effect on the link between workers' discretion and incentives. Copyright 2000 by University of Chicago Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.
Volume (Year): 18 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Pablo Casas-Arce & Santhi Hejeebu, 2004. "Job Design and the Benefits of Private Trade," Economics Series Working Papers 204, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Nick Bloom & John Van Reenen, 2010.
"Human resource management and productivity,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
28730, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen, 2010. "Human Resource Management and Productivity," NBER Working Papers 16019, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bloom, Nicholas & Van Reenen, John, 2010. "Human Resource Management and Productivity," CEPR Discussion Papers 7849, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen, 2010. "Human Resource Management and Productivity," CEP Discussion Papers dp0982, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard, 2003.
"Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor Within and Between Law Firms,"
NBER Working Papers
9719, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Thomas N Hubbard & Luis Garicano, 2003. "Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor Within and Between Law Firms," Working Papers 03-13, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
- Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014.
"Delegation and Dynamic Incentives,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
4774, CESifo Group Munich.
- Anja Schöttner, 2005. "Relational Contracts and Job Design," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2005-052, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Hans K. Hvide & Tore Leite, 2003.
"A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations,"
- Hans K. Hvide & Todd Kaplan, 2003. "A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations," Microeconomics 0311001, EconWPA.
- Hvide, Hans K & Kaplan, Todd, 2003. "Delegated Job Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.