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Discretion and Incentives in Organizations

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  • Olsen, Trond E
  • Torsvik, Gaute

Abstract

We analyze the link between workers' discretion and incentives in an organisation that lasts for several periods. In a long-lasting affiliation, it is possible for the principal to learn and update her beliefs about essential characteristics associated with either the job or the agent. This learning possibility has an important effect on the link between workers' discretion and incentives. Copyright 2000 by University of Chicago Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.

Volume (Year): 18 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 377-404

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:18:y:2000:i:3:p:377-404

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Cited by:
  1. Pablo Casas-Arce & Santhi Hejeebu, 2004. "Job Design and the Benefits of Private Trade," Economics Series Working Papers 204, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  2. Nick Bloom & John Van Reenen, 2010. "Human resource management and productivity," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 28730, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  3. Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard, 2003. "Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor Within and Between Law Firms," NBER Working Papers 9719, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Delegation and Dynamic Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 4774, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Anja Schöttner, 2005. "Relational Contracts and Job Design," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2005-052, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  6. Hans K. Hvide & Tore Leite, 2003. "A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations," Finance 0311003, EconWPA.
  7. Hvide, Hans K & Kaplan, Todd, 2003. "Delegated Job Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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