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Job Design and the Benefits of Private Trade

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  • Pablo Casas-Arce
  • Santhi Hejeebu
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    Abstract

    We reconsider the job design theory of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), to include career concerns considerations. When reputations are considered, discretion may play a more integral part of the incentive scheme. It can be a useful instrument to enhance incentives and prevent the adverse selection of low ability agents. We then show that these synergies are useful in explaining the employment of U.S. faculty members and the employment of agents in the English East India Company, an historically important firm.

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    File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/working_papers/paper204.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 204.

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    Date of creation: 01 Sep 2004
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    Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:204

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    Related research

    Keywords: Job Design; Multitasking; Career Concerns;

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    1. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J., 1999. "Multi-Task Learning and the Reorganization of Work. From Tayloristic to Holistic Organization," IZA Discussion Papers 39, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Olsen, Trond E & Torsvik, Gaute, 2000. "Discretion and Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 377-404, July.
    3. Iain Cockburn & Rebecca Henderson & Scott Stern, 1999. "Balancing Incentives: The Tension Between Basic and Applied Research," NBER Working Papers 6882, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Dewatripont, Mathias & Jewitt, Ian & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 183-98, January.
    5. Brickley, James A. & Zimmerman, Jerold L., 2001. "Changing incentives in a multitask environment: evidence from a top-tier business school," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 367-396, December.
    6. Meyer, Margaret A. & Olsen, Trond E. & Torsvik, Gaute, 1996. "Limited intertemporal commitment and job design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 401-417, December.
    7. Dewatripont, Mathias & Jewitt, Ian & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 199-217, January.
    8. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.
    9. Slade, Margaret E, 1996. "Multitask Agency and Contract Choice: An Empirical Exploration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(2), pages 465-86, May.
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