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Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications

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Author Info
George-Marios Angeletos
Alessandro Pavan

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Abstract

In recent years there has been a growing interest in macro models with heterogeneity in information and complementarity in actions. These models deliver promising positive properties, such as heightened inertia and volatility. But they also raise importantnormative questions, such as whether the heightened inertia and volatility are socially undesirable, whether there is room for policies that correct the way agents use information in equilibrium, and what are the welfare effects of the information disseminated by the media or policy makers. We argue that a key to answering all these questions is the relation between the equilibrium and the socially optimal degrees of coordination. The former summarizes the private value from aligning individual decisions, whereas the latter summarizes the value that society assigns to such an alignment once all externalities are internalized. (JEL: C72, D62, D82) (c) 2007 by the European Economic Association.

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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.

Volume (Year): 5 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (04-05)
Pages: 585-593
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:5:y:2007:i:2-3:p:585-593

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. N. Gregory Mankiw & Ricardo Reis, 2006. "Sticky Information in General Equilibrium," NBER Working Papers 12605, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1103-1142, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Geore-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000289, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2006. "Optimal Communication," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000236, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December. [Downloadable!]
  6. Christian Hellwig, 2004. "Heterogeneous Information and the Benefits of Public Information Disclosures (October 2005)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 283, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Paul A. Grout & Sebastien Mitraille & Silvia Sonderegger, 2008. "The Costs and Benefits of "Strangers": Why Mixed Communities Are Better," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 08/191, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  2. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Policy with Dispersed Information," NBER Working Papers 13590, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Huang, Weiting, 2009. "作为人力资本的语言：专业化、组织沟通与语言习得
    [Language as Human Capital: Labor Specialization, Organizational Communication and Language Acquisition]    ," MPRA Paper 15677, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2007. "Monetary policy and its informative value," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
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