Centralized Or Decentralized Information: Which Is Better For Providing Incentives?
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00204.x
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
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