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Pareto Efficient Income Taxation with Stochastic Abilities

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Author Info
Stephen Coate
Marco Battaglini

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Abstract

This paper studies Pareto e.cient income taxation in an economy with infinitely-lived individuals whose income generating abilities evolve according to a two-state Markov process. The study yields two main results. First, when individuals are risk neutral, the fraction of individuals who face a positive marginal income tax rate is always positive but converges to zero. Moreover, the tax rate these individuals face also goes to zero. Second, Pareto e.cient income tax systems can be time-consistent even when the degree of correlation in ability types is large

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Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2004 Meeting Papers with number 140.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed004:140

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Keywords: dynamic taxation

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - General
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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  1. Mikhail Golosov & Narayana Kocherlakota & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2003. "Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(3), pages 569-587, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Stokey, Nancy L, 1989. "Reputation and Time Consistency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 134-39, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1999. "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 6891, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2003. "Designing Optimal Disability Insurance," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000217, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Battaglini, Marco, 2005. "Optimality and Renegotiation in Dynamic Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 5014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Roberts, Kevin, 1984. "The Theoretical Limits of Redistribution," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(2), pages 177-95, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Diamond, P. A. & Mirrlees, J. A., 1978. "A model of social insurance with variable retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 295-336, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2003. "Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000426, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 69-76, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Marco Battaglini, 2003. "Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000048, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Albanesi, Stefania & Sleet, Christopher, 2003. "Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 4006, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Daron Acemoglu & Michael Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2006. "Markets Versus Governments: Political Economy of Mechanisms," NBER Working Papers 12224, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Salvador Balle & Amedeo Spadaro, 2006. "Optimal Nonlinear Labor Income Taxation in Dynamic Economies," Working Papers 19, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Marek Kapicka, 2006. "Optimal Income Taxation with Human Capital Accumulation and Limited Record Keeping," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(4), pages 612-639, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. J. C. Parra & M. Huggett, 2005. "Quantifying the Inefficiency of the US Social Security System," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 70, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Yuzhe Zhang, 2005. "Dynamic contracting, persistent shocks and optimal taxation," Working Papers 640, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  6. Narayana R Kocherlakota, 2005. "Advances in Dynamic Optimal Taxation," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000518, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Marco Battaglini, 2005. "Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 637-658, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Daron Acemoglu & Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2007. "Political Economy of Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000886, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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