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The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions in Brazil: The Limits of the Inflation-targeting Strategy, 1999-2005

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  • Matias Vernengo

Abstract

This paper suggests that the time-inconsistency approach is inadequate to analyze the political economy of monetary policy in Brazil. The paper develops an alternative theory that emphasizes distributive conflict, and argues that building credibility with a fixed exchange rate and through inflation-targeting was not central for stabilization. A contested-terrain analysis of the Brazilian case suggests that the current monetary regime benefits financial or rentier interests while the manufacturing sector and workers bear the costs of this policy.

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File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09538250701661863
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Review of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 20 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 95-110

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Handle: RePEc:taf:revpoe:v:20:y:2008:i:1:p:95-110

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  1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  2. Ernesto H. Stein & Jeffry Frieden & Piero Ghezzi, 2000. "Politics and Exchange Rates: A Cross-Country Approach to Latin America," Research Department Publications 3119, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  3. Bernhard, William & Broz, J. Lawrence & Clark, William Roberts, 2002. "The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(04), pages 693-723, September.
  4. Reinhart, Carmen & Calvo, Guillermo, 2002. "Fear of floating," MPRA Paper 14000, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Gerald Epstein, 2003. "Alternatives to Inflation Targeting Monetary Policy for Stable and Egalitarian Growth: A Brief Research Summary," Working Papers wp62, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
  6. Barry Eichengreen, 2002. "Can Emerging Markets Float? Should They Inflation Target?," Working Papers Series 36, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
  7. James K. Galbraith, 1997. "Time to Ditch the NAIRU," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 93-108, Winter.
  8. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April.
  9. Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608, December.
  11. Adam S. Posen, 1995. "Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 253-274 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Fernando J. Cardim De Carvalho, 1996. "The Independence of Central Banks: A Critical Assessment of the Arguments," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 18(2), pages 159-175, January.
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