The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions
AbstractWhy do national governments choose the monetary institutions they do?While this question has long interested political economists, previousliterature on the topic suffers from a central limitation: the choicesof exchange-rate regime and central bank independence (CBI) have beenanalyzed in isolation from one another. This is surprising given thatprominent arguments from this literature portray these institutions assolutions to the same problem the time-inconsistency of monetary policy,or the inability of policymakers to commit credibly to staying thecourse on an announced policy.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal International Organization.
Volume (Year): 56 (2002)
Issue (Month): 04 (September)
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