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Dynamic Inconsistency and Exchange-Rate Target Zones: A Welfare Analysis

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  • Zhen Zhu
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Abstract

This paper examines the welfare implications of different exchange-rate systems, especially an exchange-rate target-zone system, in a context of monetary policy making and dynamic inconsistency. It is shown that when there is uncertainty, there is a trade-off between commitment to a rule and discretion. A free-floating exchange-rate system may have the same loss function values in terms of price and output fluctuations as that of a target zone. However, a target-zone system may be more attractive since there is less exchange-rate fluctuation. Returning to a fixed-rate system may be worse since it may bring about larger welfare losses especially when supply shocks dominate. [F31, E52]

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Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal International Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 11 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 15-38

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Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:11:y:1997:i:1:p:15-38

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  13. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  14. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  15. Belden, Susan, 1989. "Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 432-41, November.
  16. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  17. Sutherland, Alan, 1995. "Monetary and real shocks and the optimal target zone," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 161-172, January.
  18. Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1986. "Is Time-Inconsistent Behaviour Really Possible?," CEPR Discussion Papers 138, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Lars E. O. Svensson, 1992. "An Interpretation of Recent Research on Exchange Rate Target Zones," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 119-144, Fall.
  20. Klein, Michael W, 1990. "Playing with the Band: Dynamic Effects of Target Zones in an Open Economy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(4), pages 757-72, November.
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