Terror Support And Recruitment
AbstractWe analyse a dynamic model linking terrorist activities to popular support through a recruitment mechanism. It is shown that anti-terrorism policies focusing on liberal ideals (reducing repression, increasing economic opportunity) are effective at abating recruitment, thereby affecting the dynamic stability of terrorist attacks. In contrast, deterrence's comparative advantage is in counteracting hard-core members, implying that terror eradication itself requires an emphasis on hard-core membership, rather than popular support for terror activities.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Defence and Peace Economics.
Volume (Year): 16 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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- Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger, . "How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence," IEW - Working Papers 137, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- 11 de setembro: What makes a terrorist?
by Pedro Henrique C.G. de Sant'Anna in Homo Econometricum on 2007-09-12 01:48:00
- Pierre-Emmanuel Ly, 2007. "The charitable activities of terrorist organizations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 177-195, April.
- Michael McBride & Gary Richardson, 2012.
"Stopping Suicide Attacks: Optimal Strategies and Unintended Consequences,"
Defence and Peace Economics,
Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(5), pages 413-429, October.
- Michael McBride & Gary Richardson, 2010. "Stopping Suicide Attacks: Optimal Strategies and Unintended Consequences," NBER Working Papers 16637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Luis A. Gil-Alana & Carlos P. Barros, 2010.
"A Note on the Effectiveness of National Anti-Terrorist Policies: Evidence from ETA,"
Conflict Management and Peace Science,
Peace Science Society (International), vol. 27(1), pages 28-46, February.
- Carlos P. Barros & Luis A. Gil-Alana, 2009. "A note on the effectiveness of national anti-terrorist policies. Evidence from ETA," Faculty Working Papers 10/09, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
- Peter Phillips, 2011. "The Life Cycle of Terrorist Organizations," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 369-385, November.
- Peter Phillips, 2011. "Terrorists’ Equilibrium Choices When No Attack Method is Riskless," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 39(2), pages 129-141, June.
- Cárceles-Poveda, Eva & Tauman, Yair, 2011. "A strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 49-65, January.
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