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Hiding in plain sight – using signals to detect terrorists

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Author Info
Atin Basuchoudhary ()
Laura Razzolini ()

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Abstract

This paper studies the interaction between a governmental security agency, as the Transportation Security Agency, or the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and a terrorist organization, like Al Qaeda. The governmental agency wants to stop the terrorists, but first must infer whether a visa applicant or an airline passenger is a terrorist on the basis of some observable signal. The terrorist organization's objective is to get past security to commit murder and mayhem. We derive the equilibrium strategy for this signaling model, and evaluate specific anti-terrorist policies, as the creation of the new Homeland Security Agency and increased airport security screening. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-006-9052-x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 128 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 245-255
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:128:y:2006:i:1:p:245-255

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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Related research
Keywords: Terrorism Deterrence Signaling game Non cooperative game Nash equilibrium

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Cauley, Jon & Im, Eric Iksoon, 1988. "Intervention Policy Analysis of Skyjackings and Other Terrorist Incidents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 27-31, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lapan, Harvey E. & Sandler, Todd, 2003. "Terrorism and Signalling," Staff General Research Papers 10808, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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  3. John Knowles & Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, 2001. "Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(1), pages 203-232, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Lapan, Harvey E & Sandler, Todd, 1988. "To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That Is the Question," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 16-21, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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