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Balancing congestion and security in the presence of strategic applicants with private information

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  • Wang, Xiaofang
  • Zhuang, Jun
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    Abstract

    Concerns on security and congestion appear in security screening which is used to identify and deter potential threats (e.g., attackers, terrorists, smugglers, spies) among normal applicants wishing to enter an organization, location, or facility. Generally, in-depth screening reduces the risk of being attacked, but creates delays that may deter normal applicants and thus, decrease the welfare of the approver (authority, manager, screener). In this paper, we develop a model to determine the optimal screening policy to maximize the reward from admitting normal applicants net of the penalty from admitting bad applicants. We use an M/M/1 queueing system to capture the impact of security screening policies on system congestion and use game theory to model strategic behavior, in which potential applicants with private information can decide whether to apply based on the observed approver's screening policy and the submission behavior of other potential applicants. We provide analytical solutions for the optimal non-discriminatory screening policy and numerical illustrations for both the discriminatory and non-discriminatory policies. In addition, we discuss more complex scenarios including imperfect screening, abandonment behavior of normal applicants, and non-zero waiting costs of attackers.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Operational Research.

    Volume (Year): 212 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 1 (July)
    Pages: 100-111

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:212:y:2011:i:1:p:100-111

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eor

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    Keywords: Decision analysis Game theory Queueing Risk management;

    References

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    8. Garrick Blalock & Vrinda Kadiyali & Daniel H. Simon, 2007. "The Impact of Post-9/11 Airport Security Measures on the Demand for Air Travel," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 731-755.
    9. Jun Zhuang & Vicki Bier, 2011. "Secrecy And Deception At Equilibrium, With Applications To Anti-Terrorism Resource Allocation," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 43-61.
    10. Golany, Boaz & Kaplan, Edward H. & Marmur, Abraham & Rothblum, Uriel G., 2009. "Nature plays with dice - terrorists do not: Allocating resources to counter strategic versus probabilistic risks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 192(1), pages 198-208, January.
    11. Balachandran, K. R. & Schaefer, Mark E., 1980. "Public and private optimization at a service facility with approximate information on congestion," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 195-202, March.
    12. James Yetman, 2004. "Suicidal Terrorism And Discriminatory Screening: An Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 221-230.
    13. Claeys, Dieter & Walraevens, Joris & Laevens, Koenraad & Bruneel, Herwig, 2010. "A queueing model for general group screening policies and dynamic item arrivals," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 207(2), pages 827-835, December.
    14. Zhuang, Jun & Bier, Vicki M. & Alagoz, Oguzhan, 2010. "Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 203(2), pages 409-418, June.
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    Cited by:
    1. Shan, Xiaojun & Zhuang, Jun, 2013. "Hybrid defensive resource allocations in the face of partially strategic attackers in a sequential defender–attacker game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 228(1), pages 262-272.
    2. Liya Guo & Shan Huang & Jun Zhuang & Adel Sadek, 2013. "Modeling Parking Behavior Under Uncertainty: A Static Game Theoretic versus a Sequential Neo-additive Capacity Modeling Approach," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 327-350, September.
    3. Hausken, Kjell & Zhuang, Jun, 2013. "The impact of disaster on the strategic interaction between company and government," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 225(2), pages 363-376.
    4. Ni, Guanqun & Xu, Yinfeng & Dong, Yucheng, 2013. "Price and speed decisions in customer-intensive services with two classes of customers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 228(2), pages 427-436.

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