Applying Intermediate Microeconomics to Terrorism
AbstractThe authors show how microeconomic concepts and principles are applicable to the study of terrorism. The utility maximization model provides insights into both terrorist resource allocation choices and government counterterrorism efforts, while basic game theory helps characterize the strategic interdependencies among terrorists and governments.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0412.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Education, Vol. 37:4, Fall 2006, pp. 442-458.
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Fax: (508) 793-3708
Web page: http://www.holycross.edu/departments/economics/website/
More information through EDIRC
terrorism; rational choice model; income and substitution effects; Slutsky equation; game theory; prisoners’ dilemma; chicken; public goods;
Other versions of this item:
- A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
- A22 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Undergraduate
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
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- Lapan, Harvey E. & Sandler, Todd, 1988.
"To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That is the Question,"
Staff General Research Papers
10817, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Lapan, Harvey E & Sandler, Todd, 1988. "To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That Is the Question," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 16-21, May.
- Enders, Walter & Sandler, Todd, 1995. "Terrorism: Theory and applications," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 213-249 Elsevier.
- Sandler,Todd & Hartley,Keith, 1995. "The Economics of Defense," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521447287.
- Todd Sandler, 2003. "Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(6), pages 779-802, 06.
- Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova, 2003. "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 119-144, Fall.
- Sandler, Todd & Enders, Walter, 2004. "An economic perspective on transnational terrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 301-316, June.
- Lee, Dwight R, 1988. "Free Riding and Paid Riding in the Fight against Terrorism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 22-26, May.
- Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger, . "How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence," IEW - Working Papers 137, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Todd Sandler & Kevin Siqueira, 2006. "Global terrorism: deterrence versus pre-emption," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1370-1387, November.
- Charles Anderton & John Carter, 2005. "On Rational Choice Theory And The Study Of Terrorism," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 275-282.
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