External recruitments and firm performance
AbstractIn the context of tournament theory, and drawing on a panel data set of several firms and their employees, evidence is presented of a negative relationship between the share of external recruitments for top management positions and firm productivity.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 13 (2006)
Issue (Month): 14 ()
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Web page: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/routledge/13504851.html
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