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Majority rip-off in referendum voting

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Klaus Abbink ()
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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-005-0023-9
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 26 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-21
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:26:y:2006:i:1:p:1-21

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Selten,Reinhard, . "A demand commitment model of coalition bargaining," Discussion Paper Serie B 191, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Frey, Bruno S & Kucher, Marcel & Stutzer, Alois, 2001. " Outcome, Process and Power in Direct Democracy: New Econometric Results," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(3-4), pages 271-93, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hannu Nurmi, 1998. "Voting paradoxes and referenda," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 333-350. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Laffond, Gilbert & Laine, Jean, 2000. "Representation in majority tournaments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 35-53, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Bennett, E. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Demand Commitment Bargaining: -The Case Of Apex Games," Papers 9062, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  6. Montero, M., 1999. "Noncooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel," Discussion Paper 61, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Baron, David P & Ferejohn, John, 1987. "Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 303-09, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Matsusaka, John G & McCarty, Nolan M, 2001. "Political Resource Allocation: Benefits and Costs of Voter Initiatives," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 413-48, October.
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