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The welfare effects of nationalization in a mixed duopoly public transport market

Author

Listed:
  • Feifei Qin

    (Soochow University)

  • Xiaoning Zhang

    (Tongji University)

  • Eoin Plant

    (Dublin Institute of Technology)

Abstract

Recently, many cities have launched new rail transit lines. Once these new rail transit lines start commercial operation, they will play important roles as competitors to conventional bus services. In this paper, the effects of nationalization on equilibria have been studied in a mixed duopoly public transport market, in which one publicly-owned rail transit operator competes with one private bus operator. Two numerical case studies show the nationalization of a rail transit company is always socially desirable both in Bertrand pricing game in the short run and in Nash non-cooperative game in the long run.

Suggested Citation

  • Feifei Qin & Xiaoning Zhang & Eoin Plant, 2017. "The welfare effects of nationalization in a mixed duopoly public transport market," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 593-618, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:operea:v:17:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s12351-016-0241-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s12351-016-0241-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pu‐yan Nie & Yong‐cong Yang, 2020. "Cost‐reduction innovation under mixed economy," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(7), pages 1195-1201, October.
    2. Junlong Chen & Chaoqun Sun & Ruiyu He & Yibing Zhang & Jiali Liu, 2023. "Optimal nationalization policy in a heterogeneous mixed oligopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(2), pages 807-827, March.

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