Transitions in the negotiations on climate change: from prisoner’s dilemma to chicken and beyond
AbstractFrequently, international environmental negotiations have been analyzed in two-agent (2 Ã 2) games. Yet, in order to involve additional strategies, (3 Ã 3) games gained attention recently. We employ such a (3 Ã 3) game setting in order to depict international negotiations on climate change and integrate both the prisonerâs dilemma and the chicken games in this setting. We analyze transitions of negotiation states and describe how ancillary benefits and first-mover advantages influence agentsâ behavior in the negotiations, when three different strategies or levels of climate protection efforts are available. Finally, we also integrate strategies to mitigate and to adapt to climate change into the analysis in the (3 Ã 3) game setting.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 12 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10784
Other versions of this item:
- Pittel, Karen & Rübbelke, Dirk T. G., 2012. "Transitions in the negotiations on climate change: From prisoner’s dilemma to chicken and beyond," Munich Reprints in Economics 19343, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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