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Cultural Differentiation of Negotiating Agents

Author

Listed:
  • Gert Jan Hofstede

    (Wageningen University)

  • Catholijn M. Jonker

    (Delft Technical University)

  • Tim Verwaart

    (LEI Wageningen UR)

Abstract

Negotiations proceed differently across cultures. For realistic modeling of agents in multicultural negotiations, the agents must display culturally differentiated behavior. This paper presents an agent-based simulation model that tackles these challenges, based on Hofstede’s model of national cultures. The context is a trade network for goods with a hidden quality attribute. The negotiation model is based on the ABMP negotiation architecture and applies a utility function that includes market value, quality preference and risk attitude. The five dimensions of Hofstede’s model are the basis for the modification of ABMP parameters and weight factors in the utility function. The agents can observe each other’s group membership and status. This information is used, along with the indices of Hofstede’s dimensions, to differentiate behavior in different cultural settings. The paper presents results of test runs that verify the implementation of the model. The model helps to explain behaviors of actors in international trade networks. It proves that Hofstede’s dimensions can be used to generate culturally differentiated agents. Further validations of the model with case studies from literature and experiments have yet to be conducted. Extensions can make this model a useful tool for training traders who engage in cross-cultural negotiation and for implementation in negotiation support systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Gert Jan Hofstede & Catholijn M. Jonker & Tim Verwaart, 2012. "Cultural Differentiation of Negotiating Agents," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 79-98, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:21:y:2012:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-010-9190-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-010-9190-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dmytro Tykhonov & Catholijn Jonker & Sebastiaan Meijer & Tim Verwaart, 2008. "Agent-Based Simulation of the Trust and Tracing Game for Supply Chains and Networks," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 11(3), pages 1-1.
    2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
    3. Metcalf, Lynn E. & Bird, Allan & Shankarmahesh, Mahesh & Aycan, Zeynep & Larimo, Jorma & Valdelamar, Dídimo Dewar, 2006. "Cultural tendencies in negotiation: A comparison of Finland, India, Mexico, Turkey, and the United States," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 382-394, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nassiri-Mofakham, Faria & Huhns, Michael N., 2023. "Role of culture in water resources management via sustainable social automated negotiation," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    2. Filipe Costa Souza & Leandro Chaves Rêgo, 2014. "Mixed Equilibrium, Collaborative Dominance and Burning Money: An Experimental Study," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 377-400, May.
    3. Eleni N. Arvaniti & Agapi Dima & Chrysostomos D. Stylios & Vagelis G. Papadakis, 2022. "A New Step-by-Step Model for Implementing Open Innovation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(10), pages 1-17, May.
    4. Gert Jan Hofstede & Catholijn M. Jonker & Tim Verwaart & Neil Yorke-Smith, 2019. "The Lemon Car Game Across Cultures: Evidence of Relational Rationality," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(5), pages 849-877, October.
    5. Mario Barchi & Marco Greco, 2018. "Negotiation in Open Innovation: A Literature Review," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 343-374, June.
    6. Stephanie Eckerd & Kenneth K. Boyer & Yinan Qi & Adam Eckerd & James A. Hill, 2016. "Supply Chain Psychological Contract Breach: An Experimental Study across National Cultures," Journal of Supply Chain Management, Institute for Supply Management, vol. 52(3), pages 68-82, July.
    7. Harri T. Luomala & Rajesh Kumar & J. D. Singh & Matti Jaakkola, 2015. "When an Intercultural Business Negotiation Fails: Comparing the Emotions and Behavioural Tendencies of Individualistic and Collectivistic Negotiators," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 537-561, May.
    8. Nidhi Wali & Andre M N Renzaho, 2018. "“Our riches are our family”, the changing family dynamics & social capital for new migrant families in Australia," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(12), pages 1-14, December.
    9. Ogliastri, Enrique & Quintanilla, Carlos & Benetti, Sara, 2023. "International negotiation prototypes: The impact of culture," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    10. Hussein, Mohamed E. & Kraten, Michael & Seow, Gim S. & Tam, Kinsun, 2017. "Influences of Culture on Transfer Price Negotiation," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 227-237.
    11. Anneli Kaasa & Maaja Vadi & Urmas Varblane, 2014. "Regional Cultural Differences Within European Countries: Evidence from Multi-Country Surveys," Management International Review, Springer, vol. 54(6), pages 825-852, December.
    12. Desmarchelier, Benoît & Fang, Eddy S., 2016. "National culture and innovation diffusion. Exploratory insights from agent-based modeling," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 121-128.

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