The semantics of preference-based belief operators
AbstractWe show how different kinds of belief operators derived from preferences can be defined in terms an accessibility relation of epistemic priority, and characterized by means of a vector of nested accessibility relations. The semantic structure is used to reconcile and compare certain non-standard notions of belief that have recently been used in epistemic analyses of games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 05/2003.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 21 Feb 2003
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
More information through EDIRC
Belief operators; decision theory; belief revision;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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