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Caught Telling the Truth: Effects of Honesty and Communication Media in Distributive Negotiations

Author

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  • Paul W. Paese

    (University of Missouri - St. Louis)

  • Ann Marie Schreiber

    (University of Missouri - St. Louis)

  • Adam W. Taylor

    (University of Missouri - St. Louis)

Abstract

In the present research, the authors varied the presence versus absence of an honest disclosure in two-party negotiations. Confederates who posed as participants and followed a script carried out the disclosure manipulation. In Experiment 1, communication mode (face-to-face vs. telephone vs. electronic mail) was crossed with disclosure, and an interaction was observed. Specifically, the remote media (phone and e-mail) were found to induce competitive negotiation behavior, but only when there was no honest disclosure; that is, the honest disclosure suppressed the competitive behavior that was otherwise induced by the remote media. Experiment 2 replicated the e-mail condition of Experiment 1, with the only difference being that negotiators were anonymous to one another. Despite the anonymity, the honest disclosure continued to have the same cooperation-inducing effect. Implications of these results and future research directions are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul W. Paese & Ann Marie Schreiber & Adam W. Taylor, 2003. "Caught Telling the Truth: Effects of Honesty and Communication Media in Distributive Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 12(6), pages 537-566, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:12:y:2003:i:6:d:10.1023_b:grup.0000004334.14310.90
    DOI: 10.1023/B:GRUP.0000004334.14310.90
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ingmar Geiger, 2020. "From Letter to Twitter: A Systematic Review of Communication Media in Negotiation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 207-250, April.
    2. Andreas Engelmann & Ingrid Bauer & Mateusz Dolata & Michael Nadig & Gerhard Schwabe, 2022. "Promoting Less Complex and More Honest Price Negotiations in the Online Used Car Market with Authenticated Data," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 419-451, April.
    3. Michael Ahearne & Yashar Atefi & Son K. Lam & Mohsen Pourmasoudi, 2022. "The future of buyer–seller interactions: a conceptual framework and research agenda," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 22-45, January.
    4. Edy Glozman & Netta Barak-Corren & Ilan Yaniv, 2013. "False negotiations: The art & science of not reaching an agreement," Discussion Paper Series dp646, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

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