Changing rewards in contests: Has the three-point rule brought more offense to soccer?
AbstractIn the mid-nineties FIFA decided to increase from two to three the number of points assigned to the winning team of a soccer match played under traditional round-robin national leagues. Since a game of soccer can be regarded as a contest, FIFA's measure provides an interesting case-study for analysing how a change in the system of rewards (from a zero to a non-zero sum rule) may affect the contestants' equilibrium behaviour. In this paper we try to assess, both theoretically and empirically, whether FIFA's new point rule has changed soccer towards a more offensive game, in which teams adopt more risky strategies. In particular, we evaluate the "naïve hypothesis" according to which the measure would induce every team to play always more offensively, and we explore the extent to which the change in teams' behaviour may be affected by quality differentials between teams. Our most important hypothesis is that when the asymmetry between opposing teams is large enough, an increase in the reward for victory induces the weaker team to play more defensively, rather than the opposite. By looking at a subset of matches held in the Portuguese first division league, which approximate the conditions of our model, we find support for this hypothesis.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Empirical Economics.
Volume (Year): 27 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Note: received: July 1999/Final version received: May 2001
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- Stefan Wagner, 2010. "Managerial succession and organizational performance-evidence from the German Soccer League," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(6), pages 415-430.
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Staff General Research Papers
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- Lee, Yoong Hon & Parinduri, Rasyad, 2013. "Does the Three-Point Rule Make Soccer More Exciting? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design," MPRA Paper 48467, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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