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Inventing New Signals

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  • Jason McKenzie Alexander
  • Brian Skyrms
  • Sandy Zabell

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Suggested Citation

  • Jason McKenzie Alexander & Brian Skyrms & Sandy Zabell, 2012. "Inventing New Signals," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 129-145, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:2:y:2012:i:1:p:129-145
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-011-0027-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-881, September.
    2. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    3. Argiento, Raffaele & Pemantle, Robin & Skyrms, Brian & Volkov, Stanislav, 2009. "Learning to signal: Analysis of a micro-level reinforcement model," Stochastic Processes and their Applications, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 373-390, February.
    4. Pawlowitsch, Christina, 2008. "Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 203-226, May.
    5. Bhaskar, V., 1998. "Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 110-131, September.
    6. Warneryd Karl, 1993. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 532-546, October.
    7. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Luigi Marengo & Paolo Zeppini, 2016. "The arrival of the new," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 171-194, March.

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