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Bargaining and the effectiveness of international criminal regimes

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  • Emily Hencken Ritter
  • Scott Wolford

Abstract

International institutions lack the independent ability to punish non-compliance, but states sustain cooperation because they can target one another for punishment. In contrast, international criminal courts and tribunals (ICTs) can enforce rulings once suspects are in custody, but they lack the independent power of capture, leaving them unable to punish alleged criminals and therefore deter crime. We analyze a game between an ICT and a suspect to assess the potential of pre-arrest bargaining as a solution to the problem of capture. We show that ICTs that bargain with fugitives will be able to secure their surrender and administer justice, although this comes at the cost of incentivizing some crime. Further, those courts least able to secure their suspects’ capture will, surprisingly, be the most willing to issue warrants. International institutions may thus be able to achieve compliance even when faced with uncooperative member states.

Suggested Citation

  • Emily Hencken Ritter & Scott Wolford, 2012. "Bargaining and the effectiveness of international criminal regimes," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(2), pages 149-171, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:24:y:2012:i:2:p:149-171
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629811429048
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    References listed on IDEAS

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