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Two state disputes and outside intervention: the case of Nagorno–Karabakh conflict

Author

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  • Ani Harutyunyan

    (KU Leuven)

Abstract

The paper proposes a game theoretical model of a dispute between two states. It analyzes the possible outcome of the dispute and the probability of war depending on the distribution of power between those states, the costs of fighting in the war and the level of uncertainty about each other’s costs. The paper also examines two types of outside intervention analyzing their separate and joint effect on the final outcome and the probability of war. The model is applied to the case of Nagorno–Karabakh conflict and some concluding remarks are provided regarding the probability of war break out and possible resolutions of the conflict.

Suggested Citation

  • Ani Harutyunyan, 2017. "Two state disputes and outside intervention: the case of Nagorno–Karabakh conflict," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 7(1), pages 69-93, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eurase:v:7:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s40822-017-0064-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s40822-017-0064-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Powell, Robert, 1996. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 255-289, August.
    3. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    4. Robert Powell, 2004. "Bargaining and Learning While Fighting," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(2), pages 344-361, April.
    5. Kevin Siqueira, 2003. "Conflict and third-party intervention," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(6), pages 389-400.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Interstate conflict; Third party intervention; Coercive intervention; Nagorno–Karabakh; Armenia; Azerbaijan;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F50 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - General
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
    • N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East

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