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The Singularity of the German Doctorate as a Signal for Managerial Talent: Causes, Consequences and Future Developments

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  • Egon Franck

    (University of ZurichInstitute of Strategy and Business Economics)

  • Christian Opitz

    (Zeppelin UniversityZF-Friedrichshafen Chair for Strategy and Leadership)

Abstract

The paper focuses on signaling options for managerial talent under different higher education regimes. The educational paths in a sample of top managers of the 100 largest publicly traded companies in the U.S., France and Germany are consistent with our theoretical conjectures. For the singular role of the German doctorate, the traditional chair system in doctoral education and training is essential. The effects of higher education reforms are discussed. In Germany the doctorate is a powerful signal for managerial talent. Future signaling options are closely tied to German higher education reform.

Suggested Citation

  • Egon Franck & Christian Opitz, 2007. "The Singularity of the German Doctorate as a Signal for Managerial Talent: Causes, Consequences and Future Developments," management revue. Socio-economic Studies, Rainer Hampp Verlag, vol. 18(2), pages 220-244.
    • Handle: RePEc:rai:mamere:doi_10.1688/1861-9908_mrev_2007_02_franck
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Frei, Irina & Grund, Christian, 2017. "Antecedents of Overtime Work: The Case of Junior Academics," IZA Discussion Papers 11065, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Downar, Benedikt & Ernstberger, Jürgen & Koch, Christopher, 2021. "Who makes partner in Big 4 audit firms? – Evidence from Germany," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    3. Irina Frei & Christian Grund, 2022. "Working-time mismatch and job satisfaction of junior academics," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 92(7), pages 1125-1166, September.
    4. Schmid, Stefan & Wurster, Dennis J., 2017. "International work experience: Is it really accelerating the way to the management board of MNCs?," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 991-1008.
    5. Martin Glaum, 2020. "Financial Reporting in Non-listed Family Firms: Insights from Interviews with CFOs," Schmalenbach Business Review, Springer;Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft, vol. 72(2), pages 225-270, April.
    6. Dilger, Alexander, 2019. "Von der Promotion zur Professur: Fünfzehn Tipps für den wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchs [From the doctorate to the professorship: Fifteen tips for young academics]," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 12/2019, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    7. Annika C. Froehlich, 2016. "Does the curricular structure affect doctoral enrolment?," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 86(9), pages 1067-1089, December.
    8. Oliver Entrop & Matthias F. Merkel, 2020. "Managers’ research education, the use of FX derivatives and corporate speculation," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 869-901, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Doctoral Education; Signaling; Managerial Talent; German Higher Education; Higher Education Reform;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

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