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Incitations et transitions sur le marché du travail. Une analyse des stratégies d'acceptation et de refus d'emploi

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Author Info

  • Jean-François Ouvrard
  • Patrick Maillé
  • Thierry Laurent
  • Yannick L'Horty

Abstract

[fre] L'objet de l'article est de proposer une méthode permettant d'évaluer, dans un cadre intertemporel, l'ampleur des phénomènes de désincitation à la reprise d'emploi. Un chômeur accepte un emploi si ce dernier rend maximale son espérance de gains, compte tenu des revenus associés à chaque type de situation sur le marché du travail, de ses chances d'évolution d'une situation vers une autre et de son taux de préférence pour le présent. Dans ce cadre général, on montre qu'il peut être « rentable » d'occuper un emploi qui rapporte un revenu inférieur aux revenus de remplacement dont on pourrait bénéficier dans l'assistance. Inversement, on peut avoir intérêt à rester dans le non-emploi et à refuser des emplois immédiatement rémunérateurs. Ces résultats théoriques — illustrés par des simulations numériques — suggèrent que les gains immédiats ne sont pas les plus déterminants dans la décision d'accepter ou non une proposition d'emploi. [eng] Incentives and transitions on the labor market: an analysis of acceptation or refusal employment strategies. This paper proposes an intertemporal and consistent framework in order to measure the incentives for returning to employment. A job seeker accepts a job which maximizes the sum of his discounted expected incomes, taking into account earnings associated with every job, worker's mobility between jobs and his rate of preference for the present. In this framework, we show that work can pay, even if it does not pay immediately. Inversely, high immediate gain can be compensated by unfavorable perspectives. These theoretical results - illustrated by numerical simulations - show that monetary gain upon return to employment is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to explain the existence of a low level of labor force participation originated in incentive problems. preference for the present. In this framework, we show that work can pay, even if it does not pay immediately. Inversely, high immediate gain can be compensated by unfavorable perspectives. These theoretical results - illustrated by numerical simulations - show that monetary gain upon return to employment is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to explain the existence of a low level of labor force participation originated in incentive problems.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 53 (2002)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 1181-1203

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2002_num_53_6_410465

Note: DOI:10.2307/3503066
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/reco

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