In-work policies in Europe: Killing two birds with one stone?

Earning an income is probably the best way of avoiding poverty and social exclusion, hence the recent trend of promoting employment through in-work transfers in OECD countries. Yet, the relative consensus on the need for `making work pay' policies is muddied by a number of concerns relative to the design of the reforms and the treatment of the family dimension. Using the integrated microsimulation of European tax-benefit systems EUROMOD, we simulate two types of in-work transfers. The first one is a purely individualized policy while the second is means-tested on family income, in the fashion of the British Working Family Tax Credit. Both reforms are built on the same cost basis (after behavioral responses) and simulated in three European countries which experience severe poverty traps, namely Finland, France and Germany. The potential labor supply responses to the reforms and the subsequent redistributive impacts are assessed for each country using a structural discrete-choice model. We compare how both reforms achieve poverty reduction and social inclusion (measured as the number of transitions into activity). All three countries present different initial conditions, including institutional environment, existing tax-benefit systems and distribution of incomes and wage rates/incomes. These sources of heterogeneity are exploited together with different labor supply sensitivities to explain the cross-country differences in the impact of the reforms.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)