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L'argent de poche versé aux jeunes : l'apprentissage de l'autonomie financière

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  • Christine Barnet-Verzat
  • François-Charles Wolff

Abstract

[fre] L'argent de poche versé aux enfants constitue une toute première forme de transfert intergénérationnel. L'enquête Éducation 1992 révèle que, pour la France, les trois quarts des enfants scolarisés âgés de 6 à 25 ans reçoivent de l'argent de leurs parents pour un montant moyen de plus de 3 000 francs (460 euros) par bénéficiaire au cours de l’année scolaire, qu'il s'agisse de versements réguliers ou non. Ces aides augmentent très nettement avec l'âge de l'enfant et surtout avec son niveau de scolarité, en particulier lors des passages en sixième, en seconde et dans l'enseignement supérieur. L’autonomie financière des enfants progresse avec l'âge. Cette progression s’accompagne d’une plus grande régularité des versements d'argent de poche et une interaction complexe s'opère avec les revenus gagnés par l'enfant. Ce processus d’autonomie varie selon les milieux sociaux et selon le type d'études poursuivies. Les enfants reçoivent davantage d'argent de poche lorsque leurs parents disposent de revenus importants et appartiennent à des catégories sociales élevées. Dès le plus jeune âge, ces aides sont incitatives de la part des parents et relèvent d'une forme de réciprocité dans les relations entre générations: 18,2 % des familles qui ont versé des aides ponctuelles l'ont fait pour inciter les enfants à travailler à l'école, 18,5 % pour rémunérer des travaux faits à la maison. Les motivations des parents n’apparaissent donc pas seulement fondées sur l'altruisme. [spa] El dinerillo de los jóvenes constituye una de las primeras formas de transferencia intergeneracional. La encuesta Educación 1992 revela que, en cuanto a Francia, las tres cuartas partes de los niños escolarizados reciben dinero por parte de sus padres por un monto medio de más de tres mil francos (460 euros) por individuo durante el curso escolar, trátense de unos abonos regulares o no. Estas ayudas aumentan mucho en función de la edad del niño y sobre todo de su nivel escolar, en especial cuando el niño pasa de la primaria a la enseñanza secundaria y de la secundaria a la enseñanza superior. . La autonomía financiera de los niños progresa con la edad. Esta progresión va a la par con una mayor regu- laridad de los abonos de dinerillo y se da una interacción compleja con los ingresos propios del niño. Este proceso de autonomía varía según los medios sociales y según el tipo de estudios cursados. Los niños reciben más dinero cuando sus padres tienen una renta alta y pertenecen a categorías sociales altas. . Incluso para los más jóvenes, son ayudas incitativas por parte de los padres y éstas remiten a una forma de reciprocidad en las relaciones entre generaciones: el 18,2 % de las familias que han dado unas ayudas puntuales, lo ha hecho para incitar a los niños a estudiar en la escuela, el 18,5 % para retribuir unas tareas hechas en casa. Las motivaciones de los padres no se deben solamente al altruismo. [ger] Das Taschengeld, das die Kinder erhalten, stellt eine erste Art des Transfers zwischen den Generationen dar. Der Erhebung Ausbildung 1992 ist zu entnehmen, dass drei Viertel der Schüler und Studenten im Alter zwischen 6 und 25 Jahren von ihren Eltern Taschengeld von durchschnittlich mehr als 3.000 (460 Euro) während eines Schul-bzw. Studienjahres bekommen, sei es in Form regelmäßiger Zahlungen oder Einmalzahlungen. Diese finanzielle Unterstützung nimmt mit dem Alter der Kinder und insbesondere der Ausbildungsstufe zu, vor allem beim Übertritt in die weiterführende Schule, in die Sekundarstufe und in die Hochschule. . Mit dem Alter werden die Kinder finanziell eigenständiger, da das Taschengeld dann regelmäßiger gezahlt wird; gleichzeitig kommt es zu einer komplexen Wechselwirkung zwischen dem Taschengeld und dem von den Kindern selbst verdienten Geld. Der Prozess der Erlangung der Eigenständigkeit variiert je nach den sozialen Verhältnissen und je nach dem Ausbildungsgang. Denn die Kinder erhalten mehr Taschengeld, wenn ihre Eltern über bedeutende Einkünfte verfügen und einer höheren sozialen Schicht angehören. . Diese finanzielle Unterstützung der Eltern hat bereits im frühsten Alter eine Anreizfunktion und basiert in den Beziehungen zwischen den Generationen auf Gegenseitigkeit: 18,2 % der Familien, die sporadisch Taschengeld zahlten, taten dies, damit ihre Kinder in der Schule arbeiten, 18,5 %, um sie für deren Hilfe im Haus zu belohnen. Somit ist die finanzielle Unterstützung der Eltern nicht völlig uneigennützig. [eng] Pocket money for children is the very first form of intergenerational transfer. The 1992 Education survey shows that three-quarters of France’s pupils and students aged 6 to 25 each receive an average of over 3,000 French francs (460 Euros) from their parents over the school year, in the form of regular or sporadic payments. This assistance rises substantially with the child’s age and especially level of education, in particular when going into the first form, the fifth form and higher education. . Children’s financial independence grows with age, hand in hand with more regular pocket money payments. This creates a complex interaction with the income earned by the child. This process of independence varies by social background and type of studies. Children receive more pocket money when their parents have high incomes and belong to upper social classes. . From the youngest age, the parents provide this assistance as an incentive and a form of reciprocal arrangement in the intergenerational relationship: 18.2% of the families who gave ad-hoc financial assistance to their children did so to encourage them to work at school, while 18.5% did so to reward work done at home. Parents’ motivations therefore appear to be based on more than just altruism.

Suggested Citation

  • Christine Barnet-Verzat & François-Charles Wolff, 2001. "L'argent de poche versé aux jeunes : l'apprentissage de l'autonomie financière," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 343(1), pages 51-72.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_2001_num_343_1_7461
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.2001.7461
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.2001.7461
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    1. Barnet-Verzat, Christine & Wolff, Francois-Charles, 2002. "Motives for pocket money allowance and family incentives," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 339-366, June.
    2. Marcio Dias & Valérie Inés Demerson de La Ville, 2015. "Parental Mediation, a Key Element in the Construction of a Child’s Understanding in the Use of Pocket Money [La mediación parental, elemento clave de la construcción por el niño del sentido de la p," Post-Print hal-01627594, HAL.

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