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L'effet de l'allocation unique dégressive sur la reprise d'emploi

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Author Info

  • Brigitte Dormont
  • Denis Fougère
  • Ana Prieto

Abstract

[eng] The effect of the unemployment benefits time curve on the rate of return to work by job seekers is studied based on a comparison of two successive regulations. The rules in force from 1986 to 1992, before the introduction of the Single Degressive Benefit (SDB), provided for a single drop in the level of benefits. The SDB introduced in 1992, however, provides for steady decreases in benefits. . The duration model estimates show that, under the pre-1992 system, the return-to-work rate rose sharply towards the end of the full-rate benefits period. This finding holds mainly for the job seekers with the highest past wages. The introduction of the SDB levelled off the return-to-work rate time curve. The estimated highly significant deviation between the probabilities of remaining unemployed under the old and new system is only partly ascribable to macroeconomic variations. There remains a difference that can be explained by the change in benefits time curves. In other words, the type of degression implemented from 1992 to 1996 probably slowed down the return to work. [spa] El efecto del perfil económico temporal de la indemnización del paro sobre la tasa de la vuelta al empleo de los parados se hace patente al comparar dos reglamentaciones sucesivas. La reglamentación que se ha dado de 1986 a 1992, antes de la introducción del subsidio único degresivo (AUD), se caracteriza por una única baja del nivel de indemnización, mientras que el AUD introducido en 1992 preve unas bajas regulares de su monto. . Las estimaciones llevadas a cabo a partir de modelos de duración, muestran que en la reglamentación de antes de 1992 la tasa de vuelta al empleo aumenta con creces cuando se acerca el fin del periodo de indemnización a plena tasa. Este resultado es valedero esencialmente para aquellos desempleados cuyos salarios antes del paro eran los más altos. La introducción del AUD ha borrado el perfil temporal de las tasas de vuelta al empleo. La diferencia bastante fuerte entre las probabilidades de permanecer en el paro con la antigua o la nueva reglamentación se puede atribuir sólo por parte a la variación de la coyuntura macroeconómica. La diferencia que queda se puede explicar por el cambio de los perfiles temporales de indemnización. En otros términos, la degresividad, tal y como ha sido instaurada de 1992 a 1996, habría frenado la vuelta al empleo. [ger] Analysiert wird der Effekt des Zeitprofils der Arbeitslosenunterstützung auf die Quote der Arbeitslosen, die wieder eine Beschäftigung aufnehmen, wobei zwei sukzessive Regelungen miteinander verglichen werden. Die Regelung, die von 1986 bis 1992 vor Einführung der degressiven einheitlichen Unterstützung galt, zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dass das Entschädigungsniveau nur ein einziges Mal sinkt, während bei der 1992 eingeführten degressiven einheitlichen Unterstützung regelmäßige Absenkungen vorgesehen sind. . Die Schätzungen anhand von Zeitmodellen zeigen, dass bei der bis 1992 geltenden Regelung die Quote der Arbeitslosen, die wieder eine Beschäftigung aufnahmen, mit Herannahen des Endes der Entschädigung zum vollen Satz stark zunimmt. Dies gilt vor allem für die Arbeitslosen, deren früherer Lohn ziemlich hoch war. Mit der Einführung der degressiven einheitlichen Unterstützung wurde das Zeitprofil der Quoten der Wiederaufnahme einer Beschäftigung abgeflacht. Die als sehr signifikant geschätzte Differenz zwischen den Wahrscheinlichkeiten, bei der alten und bei der neuen Regelung arbeitslos zu bleiben, ist nur zum Teil auf die Schwankung der Wirtschaftskonjunktur zurückzuführen. Es bleibt eine Differenz, die durch eine Änderung der Zeitprofile der Entschädigung erklärt werden kann. Mit anderen Worten: die Degression, wie sie zwischen 1992 und 1996 zur Anwendung kam, hätte demnach die Rückkehr zur Beschäftigung verlangsamt. [fre] Le profil de l’indemnisation du chômage influence-t-il la reprise d’emploi? Cette question est étudiée en comparant deux réglementations successives de l’assurance chômage. La réglementation en vigueur de 1986 à 1992 prévoit un profil simple en deux paliers: l’indemnisation connaît une seule chute, plus ou moins forte, lors du passage de l’allocation de base à l’allocation de fin de droits. Dans le système d’allocation unique dégressive (AUD) introduit en 1992, le profil d’indemnisation se caractérise par des baisses régulières du montant de l’allocation. L’estimation de modèles de durée montre que dans la réglementation en vigueur avant 1992, le taux de reprise d'emploi augmente fortement à l'approche de la fin de la période d'indemnisation à taux plein. Ce pic dans la reprise d’emploi n’est plus observé dans la nouvelle réglementation: l'introduction de l'AUD a écrêté le profil temporel des taux de reprise d'emploi. Ce résultat vaut principalement pour les chômeurs qui bénéficiaient en emploi d’un salaire élevé. On observe un écart très significatif entre les probabilités de rester en chômage dans l'ancienne et la nouvelle réglementation (AUD). La conjoncture macroéconomique plus défavorable qui caractérise la période postérieure à 1992 n’explique qu’en partie cette différence. Ainsi, la dégressivité, telle qu'elle a été mise en oeuvre de 1992 à 1996, aurait ralenti le retour à l'emploi.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Economie et statistique.

Volume (Year): 343 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 3-28

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_2001_num_343_1_7457

Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.2001.7457
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