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L'influence de l'épargne de précaution sur la recherche d'emploi

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  • Yann Algan
  • Antoine Terracol

Abstract

[fre] L'étude de l'incidence des dispositifs d'assurance chômage sur l'offre de travail s'est limitée jusqu'ici, faute de données, au système de protection sociale au travers de l'allocation chômage. Cependant, au cours des années 90, de plus en plus de ménages ont constitué une épargne de précaution afin de compléter l'indemnisation partielle prévue par ce système. Pour l'une des premières fois, en réunissant des informations relatives à l'activité, au revenu, mais aussi au patrimoine des chômeurs, le Panel européen des ménages permet de mesurer l'impact de cette auto-assurance sur le comportement d'offre de travail des chômeurs. Cette épargne de précaution permet au chômeur d'être plus sélectif dans la recherche d'un emploi : plus elle est élevée, plus le salaire minimal à partir duquel il accepte une offre d'emploi (salaire de réserve) est élevé. Les chômeurs dépourvus d'épargne restent plus longtemps au chômage que ceux qui en sont détenteurs, mais la durée de chômage est d'autant plus longue que son niveau est élevé. Cette influence ne s'exerce toutefois de manière significative qu'au-dessus d'un patrimoine de 4 600 euros (30 000 francs), montant à peu près équivalent à une année d'allocation chômage en moyenne : cette épargne de précaution n'a d'impact sur la stratégie de recherche d'emploi que pour des niveaux équivalents à ceux de l'assurance chômage. En ce qui concerne le type d'épargne, enfin, seul le livret d'épargne possède le degré de liquidité requis pour jouer le rôle d'épargne de précaution contre les risques du marché du travail. [eng] Lack of available data has hitherto limited the study of the effect of unemployment insurance mechanisms on the labour supply to the social security system in the form of unemployment benefits. However, the 1990s saw more and more households building precautionary savings to round out the partial compensation provided for by this system. For one of the first times ever, the European Household Panel is used to measure the impact of this self-insurance on the unemployed's labour supply behaviour using information on job seekers' working patterns, incomes and assets. These precautionary savings enable the unemployed to be more selective in their job seeking : the higher the savings, the higher the minimal wage required to accept a job offer (reservation wage). Job seekers without savings remain unemployed longer than those with savings. However, the higher the level of savings, the longer the period of unemployment. Nevertheless, this influence is only significant above an assets level of 4,600 euros (30,000 French francs), which is more or less equivalent to one year of unemployment benefits on average. Hence these precautionary savings only affect the job-seeking strategies of those with savings levels equivalent to unemployment benefits. As regards the type of savings, only the savings passbook system provides the level of Iiquidity required to play the role of precautionary savings guarding against labour market risks. [spa] El estudio de la incidencia de los dispositivos de seguro de paro sobre la oferta laboral se ha limitado hasta ahora, a falta de datos, al sistema de proteccion social mediante el subsidio de paro. Sin embargo, en los anos noventa, cada vez mas hogares se han constituido un ahorro de seguridad para completar la indemnizacion parcial prevista por ese sistema. Por primera vez, al reunir unas informaciones sobre la actividad, la renta y también el patrimonio de los parados, el Panel europeo de los hogares permite medir el impacto de este autoseguro sobre el comportamiento de oferta laboral de los parados. Este ahorro de seguridad le permite al parado ser mas selectivo a la hora de buscar un empleo : cuanto mayor es, mas importante es el salario minimo a partir dei cual el individuo acepta una oferta de empleo (salario de reserva). Aquellos parados que no han constituido este tipo de ahorro permanecen mas tiempo en el paro que los otros. Pero se observa también que la duracion dei paro es mayor cuanto mas alto es el nivel de aquel ahorro. Esta influencia solo se ejerce de manera significativa cuando el patrimonio es superior a unes 4600 euros, suma casi equivalente a un ano de subsidio. Este ahorro solo influye en la estrategia de busca de empleo para unos niveles equivalentes a los dei subsidio de paro. En cuanto al tipo de ahorro, solo la libreta posee el grade de liquidez suficiente para llegar a ser un ahorro de seguridad contra los riesgos dei mercado laboral. [ger] ln Ermangelung entsprechender Daten beschränkte sich die Untersuchung der Auswirkungen der Arbeitslosenversicherungssysteme auf das Arbeitsangebot bislang auf die Arbeitslosenunterstützung des sozialen Sicherungssystems. In den 90er Jahren bildeten jedoch immer mehr Privathaushalte Vorsorgeersparnisse, um die durch dieses System vorgesehene Teilunterstützung erganzen zu können. Durch Erfassung von Daten über die Erwerbstätigkeit, das Einkommen, aber auch über das Vermögen. der Arbeitslosen ermöglicht das europäische Panel der Privathaushalte zum ersten Mal eine Messung der Auswirkungen dieser Selbstversicherung auf das Arbeitsangebotsverhalten der Arbeitslosen. Dank diesen Vorsorgeersparnissen kann der Arbeitslose bei der Suche nach einer Beschäftigung wahlerischer sein : je höher diese Ersparnisse sind, desto höher ist auch der Mindestlohn, ab dem er ein Stellenangebot (Reservelohn) annimmt. Die Arbeitslosen ohne Ersparnisse sind langer arbeitslos ais diejenigen, die über solche Ersparnisse verfügen ; die Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit ist aber desto langer, je höher sie sind. Wesentlichist dieser Einfluss allerdings erst ab einem Vermögen von 4 600 Euro ; ein Betrag, der annahernd der ein Jahr lang gezahlten durchschnittlichen Arbeitslosenunterstützung entspricht. Diese Vorsorgeersparnisse haben nur dann einen Einfluss auf die Strategie der Arbeitsuche, wenn sie genauso hoch wie die Arbeitslosenunterstützung sind. Was die Art der Ersparnisse anbelangt, sa weist nur das Sparbuch die notwendige Liquidität auf, um ais Vorsorgeersparnisse zur Absicherung gegen Arbeitsmarktrisiken dienen zu können.

Suggested Citation

  • Yann Algan & Antoine Terracol, 2001. "L'influence de l'épargne de précaution sur la recherche d'emploi," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 349(1), pages 63-76.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_2001_num_349_1_7414
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.2001.7414
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.2001.7414
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