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L'influence de l'épargne de précaution sur la recherche d'emploi

Author

Listed:
  • Yann Algan

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Antoine Terracol

    (GREMARS - Groupe de Recherches Modélisation Appliquée à la Recherche en Sciences Sociales - Université de Lille, Sciences Humaines et Sociales)

Abstract

L'étude de l'incidence des dispositifs d'assurance chômage sur l'offre de travail s'est limitée jusqu'ici, faute de données, au système de protection sociale au travers de l'allocation chômage. Cependant, au cours des années 90, de plus en plus de ménages ont constitué une épargne de précaution afin de compléter l'indemnisation partielle prévue par ce système. Pour l'une des premières fois, en réunissant des informations relatives à l'activité, au revenu, mais aussi au patrimoine des chômeurs, le Panel européen des ménages permet de mesurer l'impact de cette auto-assurance sur le comportement d'offre de travail des chômeurs. Cette épargne de précaution permet au chômeur d'être plus sélectif dans la recherche d'un emploi : plus elle est élevée, plus le salaire minimal à partir duquel il accepte une offre d'emploi (salaire de réserve) est élevé. Les chômeurs dépourvus d'épargne restent plus longtemps au chômage que ceux qui en sont détenteurs, mais la durée de chômage est d'autant plus longue que son niveau est élevé. Cette influence ne s'exerce toutefois de manière significative qu'au-dessus d'un patrimoine de 4 600 euros (30 000 francs), montant à peu près équivalent à une année d'allocation chômage en moyenne : cette épargne de précaution n'a d'impact sur la stratégie de recherche d'emploi que pour des niveaux équivalents à ceux de l'assurance chômage. En ce qui concerne le type d'épargne, enfin, seul le livret d'épargne possède le degré de liquidité requis pour jouer le rôle d'épargne de précaution contre les risques du marché du travail.

Suggested Citation

  • Yann Algan & Antoine Terracol, 2001. "L'influence de l'épargne de précaution sur la recherche d'emploi," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01017893, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-01017893
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01017893
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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