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Salaires et conditions de travail

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  • Christian Baudelot
  • Michel Gollac

Abstract

[fre] Salaires et conditions de travail . Un ouvrier qui est exposé au froid et qui porte des charges lourdes gagnera entre 4 % et 5 % de moins qu'un ouvrier non soumis à ces contraintes. En revanche, le travail de nuit comme le travail en 3x8 s'accompagne de primes. Les théories du marché du travail ne suffisent pas à expliquer ce que révèlent les observations empiriques : contrairement à ce que laisse supposer la théorie de la compensation, toutes les conditions de travail pénibles ne s'accompagnent pas d'une prime de salaire ; à l'opposé, certaines pénibilités font l'objet d'une rémunération supplémentaire, alors que la théorie de la segmentation postule que bas salaires et mauvaises conditions de travail vont de pair. . Ces deux théories de la formation des salaires, compensation et segmentation, sont en fait subordonnées au degré de visibilité et de reconnaissance des conditions de travail. Les pénibilités ne donnent lieu à compensation salariale que dans le cas où elles sont connues et reconnues explicitement par la direction de l'entreprise. En matière d'organisation du travail, on retrouve des conclusions voisines : les entreprises sont surtout aptes à saisir et à récompenser les relations de pouvoir. En outre, l'effet sur le salaire, positif ou négatif, de la place dans la hiérarchie l'emporte toujours sur celui d'une pénibilité. [eng] Wages and Working Conditions . A manual employee who works in the cold and carries heavy loads earns 4% to 5% less than a manual employee not submitted to these conditions. Yet night work, such as shift work, carries bonuses. Labour market theories do not suffice to explain the facts revealed by empirical observations. Contrary to the implications of the compensation theory, not all harsh working conditions are accompanied by a wage bonus. Conversely, higher remuneration is attributed for some harsh conditions even though the segmentation theory claims that low wages and poor working conditions go hand in hand. . These two wage formation theories, compensation and segmentation, are actually subject to the degree of visibility and recognition of working conditions. Harsh conditions only give rise to wage compensation when they are recognized as such and explicitly acknowledged by the company's management. Similar conclusions are to be found for the area of work organization: companies are in the main inclined to secure and reward positions of authority. Moreover, the positive or negative effect that the hierarchical position has on wages always prevails over that of harsh conditions. [ger] Lôhne und Arbeitsbedingungen . Ein Arbeiter, der der Kàlte ausgesetzt ist und schwere Gegenstânde transportieren muB, verdient 4 bis 5% we- niger als ein Arbeiter, der keinen solchen Belastungen unterliegt. Dagegen wird sowohl fur die Nacht- als auch fur die Schichtarbeit eine Prâmie gezahlt. Die Arbeits- markttheorien reichen nicht aus, urn die Ergebnisse der empirischen Beobachtungen zu erklàren; denn entge- gen der auf der Ausgleichstheorie begrùndeten Annahme wird nicht fur aile schweren Arbeitsbedingungen eine Lohnpràmie gezahlt. Einige Schwerstarbeiten sind aller- dings Gegenstand einer zusàtzlichen Entlohnung, obwohl der Segmentationstheorie zufolge Niedriglôhne und schlechte Arbeitsbedingungen miteinander einher- gehen. . Diese beiden Theorien der Lohnbildung, das heiBt die Ausgleichs- und die Segmentationstheorie, sind in Wirklichkeit dem Grad des Bekanntseins und der An- erkennung der Arbeitsbedingungen untergeordnet. Schwere Arbeitsbedingungen haben nur dann einen Lohn- ausgleich zur Folge, wenn die Unternehmensleitung sich deren bewuBtistund sieausdrucklich anerkennt. Im Bereich der Arbeitsorganisation gelangt man zu zwei âhnlichen SchluBfolgerungen; das heiBt die Unter- nehmen denken und entlohnen hauptsâchlich entspre- chend den innerbetrieblichen Machtverhàltnissen. Der Platz in der Hiérarchie hat immer einen entscheiden- deren EinfluB auf die Entlohnung als die Schwere der Arbeit, ganz gleich, ob dieser positiv oder negativ ist. [spa] Salarios y condiciones de trabajo . Un obrero que esté expuesto al Mo y II eve cargas pesadas ganarâ entre un 4 y un 5% menos que aquel que no esté sometido a semejantes condiciones. En cambio, el trabajo nocturno como el trabajo por turno (3x8) van asociados a mayores salarios. Las teorias del mercado laboral no logran explicar del todo lo que ponen de manifesto unas observaciones empfricas : a la inversa de lo que podrfa suponerse de lateoria de la compensaciôn, no todas las condiciones de trabajo malas van acomparïadas de mayores salarios; por el contrario, ciertas malas condiciones son objeto de una remuneraciôn suple- mentaria, aunque lateorîa de la segmentaciôn postule que los sueldos bajos y las malas condiciones de trabajo corren parejas. . Dichas dos teorias de la formaciôn de salarios, compensaciôn y segmentaciôn, estàn de hecho supeditadas al grado de visibilidad y de reconocimiento de las condiciones de trabajo. Las malas condiciones tan solo desembocan en una compensaciôn de sueldo en el caso de que estén reconocidas explfcitamente por la direction de la empresa. En el âmbito de la organizaciôn del trabajo, se dan conclusiones parecidas : las empresas presentan capacidades ante todo para captar y recompensar las relaciones de poder. Ademâs, las incidencias sobre el salario, sean positivas o negativas, de la posiciôn dentro de la jerarquîa siempre prevalecen sobre las de las malas condiciones de trabajo.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Baudelot & Michel Gollac, 1993. "Salaires et conditions de travail," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 265(1), pages 65-84.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1993_num_265_1_5759
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.1993.5759
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1993.5759
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Olivier Godechot & Marc Gurgand, 2000. "Quand les salariés jugent leur salaire," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 331(1), pages 3-24.
    2. LEDUC Kristell & GENEVOIS Anne-Sophie, 2012. "Segmentation du marché du travail - le cas luxembourgeois," LISER Working Paper Series 2012-35, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER).
    3. Nikolaos Georgantzis & Efi Vasileiou, 2014. "Are Dangerous Jobs Paid Better? European Evidence," Research in Labor Economics, in: New Analyses of Worker Well-Being, volume 38, pages 163-192, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    4. Lanfranchi, Joseph & Ohlsson, Henry & Skalli, Ali, 2002. "Compensating wage differentials and shift work preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 393-398, February.
    5. Bénédicte Galtier, 1996. "Gérer la main-d'œuvre dans la durée : des pratiques différenciées en renouvellement," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 298(1), pages 45-70.
    6. Ben Halima, Mohamed Ali & Rococo, Emeline, 2014. "Wage differences according to health status in France," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 260-268.
    7. Joseph Lanfranchi & Henry Ohlsson & Ali Skalli, 2004. "Action collective et différences compensatrices : le cas des travailleurs masculins à horaires atypiques," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(3), pages 57-79.
    8. Christian Baudelot & Michel Gollac, 1997. "Le salaire du trentenaire : question d'âge ou de génération ?," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 304(1), pages 17-35.

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