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L'intéressement en France : allégement du coût salarial ou incitation à l'effort ?

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Author Info

  • Brigitte Dormont
  • Pierre Cahuc

Abstract

[eng] Profit-Sharing in France: Reducing Labour Costs or Encouraging an Extra Effort? . Profit-sharing involves linking individual remuneration to company performance. For a long time, economists only considered it as a way to improve work productivity. However, in 1984, Martin Weitzman suggested that profit-sharing could also substantially improve employment and production on two conditions: that it is set up at macroeconomic level and that it corresponds to a reduction in the share of wages excluding profit-sharing. . Profit-sharing only took off with the Order of 1986, prohibits a cut in wages when profit-sharing is Therefore, at the end of 1989, wages excluding were not lower in firms practising profit-sharing. . The mechanisms described by Mr Weitzman to increase employment were not implemented in France. . However, industrial firms that implement perform better than the others in terms of productivity growth. In the French case, profit-sharing should analyzed as an effort motivator liable to lead productivity gains. [spa] La participaciôn en los beneficios en Francia : disminuciôn del costo salarial o incitaciôn al esfuerzo ? . La participaciôn en los beneficios consiste en asociar la remuneraciôn individual a los resultados de la empresa. Durante mucho tiempo, los economistas vieron en esa prâctica solo un medio para mejorar la productividad del trabajo. Pero, en 1984, Martin Weitzman sugiriô que la distribuciôn de los beneficios podria también aumentar considerablemente el empleo y la producciôn. Eso séria posible respetando dos condiciones : generalizarla a todas las empresas y que la misma corresponda a una disminuciôn de la proporciôn del salario no incluido en la participaciôn en los beneficios. . En Francia, los mecanismos descritos por M. Weitzman para aumentar el empleo no funcionaron asi. En efecto, la participaciôn en los beneficios solo comenzô a desarrollarse mediante la ordenanza de 1986, la que prohibe una disminuciôn salarial cuando se introduce esta ultima. . De tal modo, a fines de 1989, se observa que los salarios, excluidas las bonificaciones, no son menos elevados en las empresas que prâctica el sistema de participaciôn. . Por el contrario, las empresas industrials que implementan la participaciôn en los beneficios obtienen mejores resultados que las otras en materia de productividad y de crecimiento. En el caso francés, la participaciôn en los beneficios debe ser analizada como una incitaciôn al esfuerzo que puede Ilevar a la obtenciôn de mejoras de productividad. [fre] L'intéressement en France : allégement du coût salarial ou incitation à l'effort ? . L'intéressement consiste à relier la rémunération individuelle aux performances de l'entreprise. Pendant longtemps les économistes n'y ont vu qu'un moyen d'améliorer la productivité du travail. Mais, en 1984, Martin Weitzman a suggéré que le partage du profit pourrait augmenter considérablement l'emploi et la production sous deux conditions : être mis en place au niveau macroéconomique et correspondre à une diminution de la part du salaire, hors intéressement. . En France, les mécanismes décrits par M. Weitzman pour augmenter l'emploi n'ont pas joué. En effet, l'intéressement n'a pris son essor qu'avec l'ordonnance de 1986, laquelle interdit une diminution du salaire lors de l'introduction de l'intéressement. De ce fait, à la fin 1989, on observe que les salaires, hors prime, ne sont pas moins élevés dans les entreprises qui pratiquent l'intéressement. . En revanche, les entreprises industrielles qui mettent en oeuvre l'intéressement sont plus performantes que les autres en matière de productivité et de croissance. Dans le cas français, l'intéressement doit donc être analysé comme une incitation à l'effort pouvant conduire à des gains de productivité.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Economie et statistique.

Volume (Year): 257 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 35-44

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1992_num_257_1_5679

Note: DOI:doi:10.3406/estat.1992.5679
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/estat

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Cited by:
  1. Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 1999. "Profit sharing and strike activity in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 19-40, February.
  2. Michaël Zemmour, 2013. "Les dépenses socio-fiscales ayant trait à la protection sociale : état des lieux," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/6o65lgig8d0, Sciences Po.
  3. Anne Stévenot-Guéry & Loris Guéry, 2006. "Épargne salariale et stratégies syndicales:une analyse des représentations des syndicats à partir des discours," Working Papers CREGO 1060904, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  4. Patrice Laroche & Mathieu Floquet & Loris Guery & Chloé Guillot-Soulez & Anne Stévenot, 2013. "Les Relations Entre Epargne Salariale Et Remunerations : Une Analyse Des Strategies Et De La Coherence Des Pratiques," Post-Print halshs-00863544, HAL.

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