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Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Robert Dur ()
Joeri Sol ()
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Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also in social interaction with their colleagues, which in turn creates co-worker altruism. We study how financial incentives for productive activities can improve or damage the work climate. We show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate. We discuss some empirical evidence supporting these predictions.
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 2476.
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Date of creation: 2008Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2476Contact details of provider: Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0 Fax: +49 (89) 985369 Web page: http://www.cesifo.de
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Keywords: social interaction ; altruism ; incentive contracts ; co-worker satisfaction ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - General
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