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When Winners Feel Like Losers: Evidence from an Energy Subsidy Reform

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  • Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez
  • Barbara Cunha
  • Riccardo Trezzi

Abstract

In 2011 the Government of El Salvador implemented a reform to the liquefied gas (LPG) subsidy that increased the welfare of households in all but the top two deciles of the income distribution. However, the reform turned out to be rather unpopular, including among winners. This paper relies on ad hoc household surveys conducted before the implementation and in the following two-and-a-half years to test which factors help explain the puzzle. The analysis uses probit regressions to show that misinformation (a negativity bias by which people with limited information inferred negative consequences), mistrust of the government's ability to implement the policy, and political priors explain most of the (un)satisfaction before implementation. Perceptions improved gradually—and significantly so—over time when the subsidy reception induced households to update their initial priors, although political biases remained significant throughout the entire period. The results suggest several implications with respect to policy reforms in cases where agents have limited information.

Suggested Citation

  • Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez & Barbara Cunha & Riccardo Trezzi, 2017. "When Winners Feel Like Losers: Evidence from an Energy Subsidy Reform," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 31(2), pages 329-350.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:wbecrv:v:31:y:2017:i:2:p:329-350.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/wber/lhv058
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sweder J. G. van Wijnbergen & Tim Willems, 2016. "Learning Dynamics and Support for Economic Reforms: Why Good News Can Be Bad," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 30(1), pages 1-23.
    2. Sanjay Jain & Sharun W. Mukand, 2003. "Redistributive Promises and the Adoption of Economic Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 256-264, March.
    3. Maria Vagliasindi, 2013. "Implementing Energy Subsidy Reforms : Evidence from Developing Countries," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 11965, December.
    4. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
    5. Edward L. Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, 2013. "Why Does Balanced News Produce Unbalanced Views?," NBER Working Papers 18975, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Veldkamp, Laura, 2009. "Learning about reform: Time-varying support for structural adjustment," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 192-206, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Neil McCulloch, 2017. "Energy subsidies, international aid, and the politics of reform," WIDER Working Paper Series 174, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    2. Cecile Couharde & Sara Mouhoud, 2020. "Fossil Fuel Subsidies, Income Inequality, And Poverty: Evidence From Developing Countries," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(5), pages 981-1006, December.
    3. Omotosho, Babatunde S., 2020. "Oil price shocks, fuel subsidies and macroeconomic (in)stability in Nigeria," MPRA Paper 105464, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Jun Rentschler & Morgan Bazilian, 2017. "Policy Monitor—Principles for Designing Effective Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reforms," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(1), pages 138-155.
    5. Troncoso, Karin & Soares da Silva, Agnes, 2017. "LPG fuel subsidies in Latin America and the use of solid fuels to cook," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 188-196.
    6. S. Mauricio Medinaceli Monrroy & Marcelo G. Velázquez Bilbao La Vieja, 2023. "Hydrocarbon Prices and Subsidies in Bolivia 1986 - 2025," Development Research Working Paper Series 05/2023, Institute for Advanced Development Studies.
    7. Neil McCulloch, 2017. "Energy subsidies, international aid, and the politics of reform," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2017-174, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    8. Stephane Hallegatte & Mook Bangalore & Laura Bonzanigo & Marianne Fay & Tamaro Kane & Ulf Narloch & Julie Rozenberg & David Treguer & Adrien Vogt-Schilb, 2016. "Shock Waves," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 22787, December.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • O54 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Latin America; Caribbean

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