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Why Does Balanced News Produce Unbalanced Views?

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  • Edward L. Glaeser
  • Cass R. Sunstein

Abstract

Many studies find that presentation of balanced information, offering competing positions, can promote polarization and thus increase preexisting social divisions. We offer two explanations for this apparently puzzling phenomenon. The first involves what we call asymmetric Bayesianism: the same information can have diametrically opposite effects if those who receive it have opposing antecedent convictions. Recipients whose beliefs are buttressed by the message, or a relevant part, rationally believe that it is true, while recipients whose beliefs are at odds with that message, or a relevant part, rationally believe that the message is false (and may reflect desperation). The second explanation is that the same information can activate radically different memories and associated convictions, thus producing polarized responses to that information, or what we call a memory boomerang. An understanding of these explanations reveals when balanced news will produce unbalanced views. The explanations also account for the potential influence of "surprising validators." Because such validators are credible to the relevant audience, they can reduce the likelihood of asymmetric Bayesianism, thus promoting agreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward L. Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, 2013. "Why Does Balanced News Produce Unbalanced Views?," NBER Working Papers 18975, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18975
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    Cited by:

    1. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Dubra, Juan, 2018. "When do populations polarize? An explanation," MPRA Paper 86173, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Millner, Antony & Ollivier, Hélène & Simon, Leo, 2014. "Policy experimentation, political competition, and heterogeneous beliefs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 84-96.
    3. Bernard, René & Tzamourani, Panagiota & Weber, Michael, 2022. "Climate change and individual behavior," Discussion Papers 01/2022, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    4. Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Philipp Harms & Matthew O. Jackson, 2013. "Updating Beliefs with Ambiguous Evidence: Implications for Polarization," NBER Working Papers 19114, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Marcos Fernandes, 2019. "Confirmation Bias in Social Networks," Department of Economics Working Papers 19-05, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    6. Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez & Barbara Cunha & Riccardo Trezzi, 2017. "When Winners Feel Like Losers: Evidence from an Energy Subsidy Reform," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 31(2), pages 329-350.
    7. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Dubra, Juan, 2014. "A Theory of Rational Attitude Polarization," MPRA Paper 60129, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Schwarz, Marco A., 2017. "The Impact of Social Media On Belief Formation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 57, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    9. Balietti, Anca & Budjan, Angelika & Eymess, Tillmann & Soldà, Alice, 2023. "Strategic Ignorance and Perceived Control," Working Papers 0730, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.

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    JEL classification:

    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General

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