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Learning about reform: Time-varying support for structural adjustment

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  • Veldkamp, Laura

Abstract

Political support for structural reforms can vary dramatically over time. Countries that have sustained reforms have seen their popularity grow, while others have witnessed sudden reversals of political support. Opinion can reverse itself, without any apparent provocation, when voters are learning about the effects of reform. In this model, structural adjustment causes a drop in government services and temporary unemployment. The unemployed gradually learn about when they will be re-employed. As labor markets adjust and the cost of reform is revealed, support can gradually rise, it can remain low and suddenly rise, or there can be a quick reversal of support for a previously popular policy. Cross-sectional data, event studies and case study support the explanation. Extensions consider international policies to maintain support for reform.

Suggested Citation

  • Veldkamp, Laura, 2009. "Learning about reform: Time-varying support for structural adjustment," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 192-206, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:18:y:2009:i:2:p:192-206
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sweder J. G. van Wijnbergen & Tim Willems, 2016. "Learning Dynamics and Support for Economic Reforms: Why Good News Can Be Bad," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 30(1), pages 1-23.
    2. Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez & Barbara Cunha & Riccardo Trezzi, 2017. "When Winners Feel Like Losers: Evidence from an Energy Subsidy Reform," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 31(2), pages 329-350.
    3. Jain, Sanjay & Majumdar, Sumon, 2016. "State capacity, redistributive compensation and the political economy of economic policy reform," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 462-473.

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