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Reform from Within

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Author Info
Aaron Tornell

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Abstract

We present a model of endogenous institutional change that rationalizes reforms that have taken place in the context of economic crisis and drastic politcal change. Most of these reforms have been initiated by powerholders, even though they have ended worse-off relative to the status quo. The first point we make is that reform is the tool used by some powerful groups to limit the power of their political opponents. The second point is that groups with "common access" to the economy's resources find it individually rational to overappropriate resources. As a result the economy deteriorates. When the economy reaches a crisis conflict among groups erupts. Reform is the result of this conflict.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Harvard - Institute of Economic Research in its series Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers with number 1827.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:fth:harver:1827

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Richard J. Gilbert & Richard G. Harris, 1984. "Competition with Lumpy Investment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 197-212, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dewatripont, M & Roland, G, 1992. "Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(4), pages 703-30, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Preemption and Rent Equilization in the Adoption of New Technology," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(3), pages 383-401, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Benhabib, Jess & Radner, Roy, 1992. "The Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 155-90, April.
  9. Aaron Tornell & Gerardo Esquivel, 1995. "The Political Economy of Mexico's Entry to NAFTA," NBER Working Papers 5322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Papers 6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
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  11. Grossman, Herschel I, 1994. "Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 705-12, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Lawrence J. Lau & Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland, 1997. "Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China's Dual-Track Approach to Transition," Working Papers 97048, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
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  13. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-31, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, 1995. "Economic Reform and the Progress of Global Integration," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1733, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  15. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Romain Wacziarg & Karen Horn Welch, 2003. "Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence," NBER Working Papers 10152, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Ayhan Kose & Marco E. Terrones & Eswar Prasad, 2004. "How do trade and financial integration affect the relationship between growth and volatility?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Jun. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Robert Yarbrough, 2006. "Book Review: Thrainn Eggertsson. 2005. Imperfect Institutions: Possibilities and Limits of Reform. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI. vi + 272 pp. Cloth: $65.00; Paper: $27.95," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 85-90, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Thorsten Drautzburg & Inna Melnykovska & Rainer Schweickert, 2008. "Which Membership Matters? External vs. Internal Determinants of Institutional Change in Transition Countries," Kiel Working Papers 1421, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
  5. Campos, Nauro F & Hsiao, Cheng & Nugent, Jeffrey B, 2006. "Crises, What Crises?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5805, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Gabriella Montinola & Ramon Moreno, 2001. "The political economy of foreign bank entry and its impact: theory and a case study," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 01-11, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
  7. Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner & Mauro F. Guillen, 2004. "International Coercion, Emulation and Policy Diffusion: Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reforms, 1977-1999," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-713, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  8. S. Brock Blomberg & Gregory D. Hess & Akila Weerapana, 2002. "Terrorism From Within: An Economic Model of Terrorism," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2002-14, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
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