Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Reform from Within

Contents:

Author Info

  • Tornell, A.

Abstract

We present a model of endogenous institutional change that rationalizes reforms that have taken place in the context of economic crisis and drastic political change. Most of these reforms have been initiated by powerholders, even though they have ended worse-off relative to the status quo. The first point we make is that reform is the tool used by some powerful groups to limit the power of their political opponents. The second point is common "access" to economy's resources find it individually rational to overappropriate resources. As a result the economy deteriorates. When the economy reaches a crisis conflict among groups erupts. Reform is the result of this conflict.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Harvard - Institute for International Development in its series Papers with number 650.

as in new window
Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:harvid:650

Contact details of provider:
Postal: CAER Project, Harvard Institute for International Development, 14 Story Street, Cambridge MA 02138O
Phone: (617)495-2161
Fax: (617)495-0527
Email:
Web page: http://www.hiid.harvard.edu/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

Related research

Keywords: MACROECONOMICS ; GAME THEORY ; ECONOMIC GROWTH ; PUBLIC FINANCE ; TECHNOLOGY;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Benhabib, Jess & Radner, Roy, 1992. "The Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 155-90, April.
  2. Lawrence J. Lau & Yingyi Qian & Gerald Roland, 1997. "Reform Without Losers: An Interpretation of China's Dual-Track Approach to Transition," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 137, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  3. Dewatripont, M & Roland, G, 1992. "Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 703-30, October.
  4. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-31, December.
  5. Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, 1995. "Economic Reform and the Progress of Global Integration," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1733, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
  7. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Preemption and Rent Equilization in the Adoption of New Technology," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 383-401, July.
  8. Gilbert, Richard & Harris, Richard G., 1984. "Competition with Lumpy Investment," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt11v5q20z, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  9. Alberto Alesina & Allan Drazen, 1989. "Why are Stabilizations Delayed?," NBER Working Papers 3053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
  11. Grossman, Herschel I, 1994. "Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 705-12, June.
  12. Aaron Tornell & Gerardo Esquivel, 1995. "The Political Economy of Mexico's Entry to NAFTA," NBER Working Papers 5322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December.
  14. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March.
  15. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Falvey, Rod & Foster, Neil & Greenaway, David, 2012. "Trade Liberalization, Economic Crises, and Growth," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(11), pages 2177-2193.
  2. Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner & Mauro F. Guillen, 2004. "International Coercion, Emulation and Policy Diffusion: Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reforms, 1977-1999," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-713, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  3. Romain Wacziarg & Karen Horn Welch, 2008. "Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 22(2), pages 187-231, June.
  4. Natasa Bilkic & Thomas Gries, 2014. "Uncertainty and Conflict Decision," Working Papers 78, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics.
  5. Kose, M. Ayhan & Prasad, Eswar & Terrones, Marco E., 2006. "How Do Trade and Financial Integration Affect the Relationship between Growth and Volatility?," IZA Discussion Papers 2252, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. S. Brock Blomberg & Gregory D. Hess & Akila Weerapana, 2002. "Terrorism From Within: An Economic Model of Terrorism," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2002-14, Claremont Colleges.
  7. Robert Yarbrough, 2006. "Book Review: Thrainn Eggertsson. 2005. Imperfect Institutions: Possibilities and Limits of Reform. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI. vi + 272 pp. Cloth: $65.00; Paper: $27.95," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 85-90, 04.
  8. Blomberg, S. Brock & Hess, Gregory D. & Weerapana, Akila, 2004. "Economic conditions and terrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 463-478, June.
  9. Gabriella Montinola & Ramon Moreno, 2001. "The political economy of foreign bank entry and its impact: theory and a case study," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 2001-11, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  10. Campos, Nauro F & Hsiao, Cheng & Nugent, Jeffrey B, 2006. "Crises, What Crises?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5805, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Veldkamp, Laura, 2009. "Learning about reform: Time-varying support for structural adjustment," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 192-206, March.
  12. Wacziarg, Romain & Wallack, Jessica Seddon, 2004. "Trade liberalization and intersectoral labor movements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 411-439, December.
  13. Bilkic, Natasa & Gries, Thomas, 2012. "When to Attack an Oppressive Government?," Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62031, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  14. Thorsten Drautzburg & Inna Melnykovska & Rainer Schweickert, 2008. "Which Membership Matters? External vs. Internal Determinants of Institutional Change in Transition Countries," Kiel Working Papers 1421, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:harvid:650. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.