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The Dynamics of the Free-Rider Problem in Takeovers

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  • Harrington, Joseph E, Jr
  • Prokop, Jacek

Abstract

We explore the dynamics of a takeover bid. In contrast to preceding models, if the initial takeover bid is unsuccessful a raider is allowed to make a new tender offer in order to try and secure the remaining shares. Numerical analysis shows that the raider's tender offer rises over time as he accumulates more shares. The anticipation of a higher tender offer in the future makes shareholders more inclined to bold their shares and forces the raider to offer a higher premium than is predicted by static theories. As the time between tender offers goes to zero, we show analytically that the expected profit from engaging in a takeover goes to zero. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal Review of Financial Studies.

Volume (Year): 6 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 851-82

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Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:6:y:1993:i:4:p:851-82

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References

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  1. Larry M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere, 1989. "Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly," Levine's Working Paper Archive 201, David K. Levine.
  2. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-88, June.
  3. Ausubel, Lawrence M & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1989. "Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 511-31, May.
  4. Faruk Gul & Hugo Sonnenschein & Robert Wilson, 2010. "Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture," Levine's Working Paper Archive 232, David K. Levine.
  5. Giammarino, Ronald M & Heinkel, Robert L, 1986. " A Model of Dynamic Takeover Behavior," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(2), pages 465-80, June.
  6. Jarrell, Gregg A & Brickley, James A & Netter, Jeffry M, 1988. "The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 49-68, Winter.
  7. Holmstrom, Bengt & Nalebuff, Barry, 1992. "To the Raider Goes the Surplus? A Reexamination of the Free-Rider Problem," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 37-62, Spring.
  8. Ausubel, Lawrence M & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1992. "Bargaining and the Right to Remain Silent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(3), pages 597-625, May.
  9. Mark Bagnoli, Barton L. Lipman, 1988. "Successful Takeovers without Exclusion," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 89-110.
  10. Franks, Julian R. & Harris, Robert S., 1989. "Shareholder wealth effects of corporate takeovers : The U.K. experience 1955-1985," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 225-249, August.
  11. Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April.
  12. Hirshleifer, David & Titman, Sheridan, 1990. "Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 295-324, April.
  13. Gul, Faruk & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1988. "On Delay in Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 601-11, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Maug, Ernst, 2006. "Efficiency and fairness in minority freezeouts: Takeovers, overbidding, and the freeze-in problem," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 355-379, September.
  2. Jon D. Harford, 1997. "Firm ownership patterns and motives for voluntary pollution control," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(6), pages 421-431.
  3. Francesca Cornelli & David D. Li, 2002. "Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(3), pages 837-868.
  4. Cornelli, Francesca & Li, David Daokui, 1998. "Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers," CEPR Discussion Papers 2026, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Fluck, Zsuzsanna, 1999. "The Dynamics of the Management-Shareholder Conflict," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(2), pages 379-404.
  6. Prokop, Jacek, 2003. "Conditional versus unconditional bidding in takeovers," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 123-149, June.
  7. Liebler, Robert J., 1997. "Tender offers to influential shareholders," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 529-540, April.
  8. Ann B. Gillette & Thomas H. Noe, 2006. "If at First You Don't Succeed: The Effect of the Option to Resolicit on Corporate Takeovers," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 19(2), pages 561-603.
  9. Asquith, Daniel & Kieschnick, Robert, 1999. " An Examination of Initial Shareholdings in Tender Offer Bids," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 171-88, March.
  10. Ann B. Gillette & Thomas H. Noe, 2000. "If at first you don't succeed: an experimental investigation of the impact of repetition options on corporate takeovers," Working Paper 2000-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  11. Bilge Yilmaz, . "A Theory of Takeover Bidding," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 3-00, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  12. Bilge Yilmaz, . "A Theory of Takeover Bidding," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 03-00, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  13. Carroll, Carolyn & Griffith, John M., 2010. "Toeholds, rejected offers, and bidder gains: Do rebuffed bidders put targets in play to profit from their toeholds?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 214-221, May.
  14. Ilya Segal, 1999. "Contracting With Externalities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 337-388, May.
  15. Nico Rottke & Dirk Schiereck & Stephan Pauser, 2011. "M&A in the Construction Industry -Wealth Effects of Diversification into Real Estate Life Cycle Related Services," International Real Estate Review, Asian Real Estate Society, vol. 14(3), pages 283-310.
  16. Francesca Cornelli & David D. Li, . "Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 17-98, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  17. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos, 2012. "Information in tender offers with a large shareholder," Working Papers 453, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  18. Ferguson, Michael F, 1994. "Ownership Structure, Potential Competition, and the Free-Rider Problem in Tender Offers," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 35-62, April.
  19. Moresi, Serge, 2000. "Information acquisition and research differentiation prior to an open-bid auction1," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 723-746, July.

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