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Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees

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  • Matteo Gamalerio
  • Margherita Negri

Abstract

Do electoral incentives affect immigration policies? Exploiting the Italian system for refugees’ reception and data from Italian municipalities, we show that proximity to elections reduces the probability that a municipality applies to host a refugee center by 26%, despite the economic benefits arising from these centers. Low electoral competition and high shares of extreme-right voters drive the effect. Our results are rationalized by a theoretical model and can explain the unequal distribution of refugees across and within countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Matteo Gamalerio & Margherita Negri, 2023. "Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(4), pages 901-920.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jecgeo:v:23:y:2023:i:4:p:901-920.
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    Cited by:

    1. Boeri, Tito & Gamalerio, Matteo & Morelli, Massimo & Negri, Margherita, 2023. "Pay-As-They-Get-In: Attitudes Towards Migrants and Pension Systems," IZA Discussion Papers 15989, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Boeri, Tito Michele & Gamalerio, Matteo & Morelli, Massimo & Negri, Margherita, 2023. "Pay-as-they-get-in: attitudes towards migrants and pension systems," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121343, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Boldrini, Michela & Conzo, Pierluigi & Fiore, Simona & Zotti, Roberto, 2023. "Blaming migrants doesn’t pay: the political effects of the Ebola epidemic in Italy," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 202320, University of Turin.
    4. Silvia Peracchi, 2023. "Migration Crisis in the Local News: Evidence from the French-Italian Border," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2023021, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    migration; reception of refugees; electoral incentives; fiscal grants;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R23 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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