Large Breach Penalties and Managers´ Incentives to Invest Inside or Outside Firms
AbstractManagers´ incentives to invest in firms´ specific activities (internal investments) are compared with those to realize activities to increase their alternative market opportunities (external investments) when a managerial contract establishes a large breach penalty in the event of employment termination and wage bargaining occurs according to the outside-option principle. First, it is shown that internal and external investments are incentive substitutes from the manager´s viewpoint. Furthermore, large breach penalties against firms reduce managers´ incentives to invest inside (and raise those to invest outside) the incumbent employment relationship. By contrast, large breach penalties against managers perform better in enhancing managers´ firm-specific investments.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 165 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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