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A Theory of Joint Asset Ownership

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Author Info
 Cai, Hongbin

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Abstract

I offer a theory of joint ownership by extending the standard property right theory of the firm to situations where parties can endogenously choose the degree of specificity of their investments (i.e., both the type of investment--specific and general--and the level of each). When specific and general investments are complements, the standard GHM results are obtained and joint ownership is suboptimal. When specific and general investments are substitutes, joint ownership is optimal as long as trade takes place within the relationship. Joint ownership provides stronger incentives to make specific investments than any other forms of ownership by discouraging general investments. Copyright 2003 by the RAND Corporation.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 34 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 63-77
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:34:y:2003:i:1:p:63-77

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  1. Kalyan Chatterjee & Y. Stephen Chiu, 2007. "When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1). [Downloadable!]
  2. Naomi Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 2004. "Corporate Governance and the Plight of Minority Shareholders in the United States Before the Great Depression," NBER Working Papers 10900, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Chong-En Bai & Zhigang Tao & Changqi Wu, 2003. "Revenue Sharing and Control Rights in Team Production: Theories and Evidence from Joint Ventures.," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-563, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Chong-En Bai & Zhigang Tao & Changqi Wu, 2000. "Expropriation and Incentives for Team Production," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0807, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  5. Richard Scheelings, 2005. "Essays in Law and Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000950, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  6. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Hideshi Itoh & Hodaka Morita, 2006. "Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  8. Christian A. Ruzzier, 2009. "Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration: Williamson’s Hypothesis Reconsidered," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-119, Harvard Business School. [Downloadable!]
  9. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 2006. "Contractual Tradeoffs and SMEs Choice of Organizational Form, A View from U.S. and French History, 1830-2000," NBER Working Papers 12455, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. R. Javier Bustos S. & Julio Peña Torres & Manuel Willington, 2007. "Propiedad Extranjera y Especialización Productiva en la Industria del Vino en Chile," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv184, Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines. [Downloadable!]
  11. Oliver Gürtler, 2006. "Optimal Ownership Structures in the Presence of Investment Signals," Discussion Papers 103, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  12. Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 2004. "Corporate Governance and the Plight of Minority Shareholders in the United States before the Great Depression. Joint with Naomi Lamoreaux," UCLA Economics Online Papers 308, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Hongbin Cai, 2003. "War or Peace," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2010-1-4.

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