The Governance of Contracts: Empirical Evidence on Technology Licensing Agreements
AbstractThis paper provides new evidence on the contractual governance of technology licensing agreements. Using an international sample of licensing contracts, we explore how contracts are designed to deal with specific contractual risks. In particular, we comparatively assess the influences of transaction attributes, institutional frameworks, and strategic considerations on the creation of licenses. Empirical results reveal that contractual clauses for governance are crafted independently. This leads to a discussion of complementarities between contractual components, which are frequently assumed in theory. Furthermore, our results are certainly amongst the first to provide econometric evidence on the pervasive influence of private institutions on the trading of technology.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 163 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
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- Giebe, Thomas & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2008.
"License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 91-106, May.
- Giebe, Thomas & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2007. "License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 199, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Marco Furlotti, 2007. "There is more to contracts than incompleteness: a review and assessment of empirical research on inter-firm contract design," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 61-99, March.
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