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A gazdaságpolitikai döntéshozatal nemzetek fölötti centralizációja és a közösségi gazdaságtan. Az adóverseny elméletének néhány tanulsága
[Supranational centralization of economic policy-making and community economics: some lessons from the theory of tax competition]

Author

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  • Mike, Károly

Abstract

Mennyiben képes jelenleg a közösségi gazdaságtan az adópolitikák nemzetek fölötti centralizációjára vonatkozó politikai döntések megalapozására? Válaszunk röviden az lesz, hogy a közösségi gazdaságtan főárama - noha számos releváns gazdasági és politikai tényező hatását sikeresen elemzi - jelenleg nem kínál kielégítőnek tekinthető döntési kritériumokat a döntéshozók számára. Ennek oka, hogy központi szerepet játszik benne egy, a modellek szempontjából exogén és a közgazdasági elmélettől idegen tényező: a kormányzatok jóindulatára, pontosabban annak mértékére vonatkozó premissza. Tanulmányunk az adóverseny fiskális föderalista elméletét vizsgálja, és megpróbál általánosabb szinten is a közszektor gazdaságelméletének jelenlegi állapotára, valamint továbbfejlesztésére vonatkozó tanulságokat levonni. A kiutat az elméleti zsákutcából a kormányzati működés és döntéshozatal, valamint a kívánatos gazdaságpolitikai döntések elméletének összekapcsolása jelentheti. Erre megtörténtek az első kísérletek, de a szisztematikus és átfogó elemzés egyelőre várat magára.* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: H77.

Suggested Citation

  • Mike, Károly, 2003. "A gazdaságpolitikai döntéshozatal nemzetek fölötti centralizációja és a közösségi gazdaságtan. Az adóverseny elméletének néhány tanulsága [Supranational centralization of economic policy-making and," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 254-268.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:603
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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