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Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions

Author

Listed:
  • Walter Ferrarese

    (University of the Balearic Islands)

  • Antoni Rubí-Barceló

    (University of the Balearic Islands)

Abstract

We exploit the properties of homogeneous functions to characterize the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria of n-player symmetric games in which each player’s revenue function is not homogeneous but it can be decomposed into the sum of homogeneous functions with different degrees of homogeneity. Our results aim to provide a pathway for an easy computation of symmetric equilibria for this type of games. We discuss our results in a Cournot game, a contest game, and a public good game.

Suggested Citation

  • Walter Ferrarese & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2024. "Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 333-349, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:96:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-023-09952-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09952-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Subhasish Chowdhury & Roman Sheremeta, 2011. "A generalized Tullock contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 413-420, June.
    2. David Malueg & Andrew Yates, 2006. "Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(3), pages 719-727, April.
    3. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2011. "Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 216-219, August.
    4. Corchón, Luis C. & Torregrosa, Ramón J., 2020. "Cournot equilibrium revisited," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 1-10.
    5. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    6. Walter Ferrarese, 2022. "Equilibrium effort in games with homogeneous production functions and homogeneous valuation," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(2), pages 195-212, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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