An Empirical Comparison of Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories in 3-Person Sidepayment Games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.
Volume (Year): 45 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341
n-person games; Cooperative games; Central-union theory; Equal excess model; Myerson–Shapley solution; Kernel;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Charnes, A. & Littlechild, S. C., 1975. "On the formation of unions in n-person games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 386-402, June.
- Johansen, Leif, 1982. "Cores, aggressiveness and the breakdown of cooperation in economic games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 1-37, March.
- Andrew Postlewaite & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1973.
40, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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